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THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION: SEEKING CLARITY AND
PRECISION AMID INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE
HOSANNA-TABOR FRAMEWORK
ABSTRACT
Supported by statute and the Constitution, the ministerial exception bars
employees who are deemed “ministers” from bringing discrimination claims
against their religious employer. Religious employers—whether a religious
association, corporation, educational institution, or society—are exempted from
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employers from
discriminating on the basis of religion. The ministerial exception is no longer
limited to religious discrimination and has been expanded to apply in cases of
gender, race, age, and disability discrimination.
In 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed that a constitutional ministerial
exception existed and was supported by the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court set forth a four-factor test by which
an employee’s “ministerial status” was to be assessed: (1) whether the religious
institution held the employee out as a minister; (2) whether the employee’s title
reflected a certain degree of religious training; (3) whether the employee used
that title and held herself out to be a minister; and (4) whether the employee’s
duties reflected a role in conveying and carrying out the mission of the church.
The Court declined to adopt a rigid formula, leaving lower courts to interpret
for themselves how these factors should be applied. Thus, lower courts were not
only inconsistent in their analyses of subsequent cases, but also demonstrated a
tendency toward favoring the religious employer. In 2020, the Supreme Court
again addressed the ministerial exception, emphasizing function as key and
broadening the exception’s potential application.
This Comment proposes a solution for the inconsistencies and ambiguities
that have resulted from the Court’s four-factor test for classifying “ministers”
who then fall within the “ministerial exception,” and thereby suggests that the
Court’s most recent holding failed to properly contain the exception. First, the
proposed solution requires a balance of function and title based upon a
reasonable construction of the surrounding factual circumstances. Function
should be given the greatest weight if satisfied, but factors relating to title should
not be ignored. Second, the proposed solution requires an analysis into the
religious importance of the employee and the circumstances proffered to support
or refute that importance. The analysis must be conducted with an eye toward
the purpose of the exception: avoiding government interference with
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employment decisions relating to those employees whose functions are essential
to the employer’s religious mission.
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INTRODUCTION
Most employers in the United States are prohibited from engaging in
discrimination based on religion, race, sex, disability, or national origin—such
is the norm and thus the expectation of most employees. Most employers,
however, are not religious employers. Religious employers, contrary to what
may seem a key tenet of modern American jurisprudence, are not always subject
to antidiscrimination laws. This apparent anomaly stems from Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states that the prohibition on employers with
more than fifteen employees from discriminating on the basis of religion does
not apply to “any religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society” that hires individuals of the associated religion to perform work
connected with the activities of that religion.1 In 1987, the Supreme Court upheld
this exemption for religious organizations in Presiding Bishop v. Amos, holding
that the exemption served the permissible goal of preventing significant or
excessive governmental interference in matters of church governance.2
Over time, courts expanded their understanding of the statutory exemption
to extend to forms of discrimination other than religious.3 In 2012, the Supreme
Court elevated this statutory accommodation into a constitutional mandate under
the First Amendment, affirming the existence of a constitutional ministerial
exception.4 In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.
EEOC, the Court held that a Lutheran school teacher, Cheryl Perich, was a
minister and thus barred from bringing a discrimination claim against her
employer.5 Perich was a “called” teacher with significant religious training and
background, who taught both secular and religious subjects, led her students in
prayer, and led a school-wide chapel service about twice a year.6 Perich brought
suit, alleging she was terminated in retaliation for threatening to file a claim
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)—a suit her employer argued
was barred by the ministerial exception.7 The Court adopted a four-factor test to
determine whether the employee was a minister: (1) whether the religious
institution held the employee out as a minister; (2) whether the employee’s title
reflected a certain degree of religious training; (3) whether the employee used

1

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
3
See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); infra note 59.
4
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).
5
Id.
6
Id. at 178. The Court explained that a “called” teacher is one “regarded as having been called to their
vocation by God.” Id. at 177.
7
Id. at 180.
2
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that title and held herself out to be a minister; and (4) whether the employee’s
duties reflected a role in conveying and carrying out the mission of the church.8
The Court held that the circumstances surrounding each of these factors
indicated that the employee was a minister, though it declined to adopt a rigid
formula that would define the correct balance of factors and a threshold of what
is or is not enough to signify a minister.9
Until 2012, various circuits had applied different methods for determining
whether an employee was a minister for purposes of the exception.10 The most
widely applied approach was the “primary duties test,” which looked to whether
the employee’s duties consisted primarily of administering religion and serving
the religious mission of the church.11 Another version of that test balanced
religious duties with non-religious duties.12 Meanwhile, some circuits adopted a
three-part test that considered (1) the criteria upon which the employment
decision was made, (2) the employee’s religious qualifications, and (3) whether
the employee engaged in traditionally ecclesiastical activities.13 The Second
Circuit modified this test by adding a sliding scale where the more pervasively
religious a religious institution was, the less religious an employee’s role had to
be to qualify as ministerial.14 Though Hosanna-Tabor is precedent, its flexibility
left lower courts with much discretion in deciding how they would interpret the
test and to what extent they would adopt and apply the Court’s four-factor
analysis—leading to inconsistency in application and results.15 While the
employee’s function, the fourth factor, has been generally accepted as the most

8

Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 190.
10
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008);
Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985).
11
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; accord Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238,
1243–44 (10th Cir. 2010); EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 778
(6th Cir. 2010); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007); Ross v. Metro. Church
of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
12
Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362–63 (8th Cir. 1991); Redhead
v. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d. 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
13
Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176–77; accord Tomic v. Cath. Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039–41 (7th
Cir. 2006); Musante v. Notre Dame of Easton Church, No. 3:01CV2352(MRK), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5611,
at *15–18 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2004).
14
Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 208.
15
Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., 18-CV-0592(ALC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *18–19 (2d
Cir. Mar. 29, 2019) (holding that the Director of Public Affairs was not a minister). Compare Fratello v. Roman
Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 210 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that the school principal was a minister),
and Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that the school
teacher was a minister), with Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 610–11 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that the
school teacher was not a minister).
9
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important consideration,16 courts have diverged on how much weight should be
given to the first three factors, with some courts choosing to ignore them
altogether.17 Circuits have also varied on how many of the four factors should
be present and how strongly each factor must weigh in favor of applying the
exception.18
The ministerial exception is alive and well today, and its ambiguities once
again carried it to the Supreme Court in the 2020 case Our Lady of Guadalupe
School v. Morrissey-Berru, which originated in the Ninth Circuit.19 The circuit
court in Morrissey-Berru held that the four Hosanna-Tabor factors favored the
conclusion that the employee was not a minister.20 However, where most courts
would have likely held that the extensive nature of the employee’s religious
functions sufficed to prove ministerial status, the Ninth Circuit focused primarily
on the lack of any titular proof of ministerial status rather than the existence of
highly significant religious functions.21 By taking such a unique approach, the
Ninth Circuit gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to revisit the guidance it
had given in Hosanna-Tabor. The Supreme Court consolidated the case with
Biel v. St. James School, another Ninth Circuit case, and certified the issue of
whether adjudication of a claim is barred by the ministerial exception when an
employee carries out important religious functions.22 The Court held that the
plaintiffs in both cases should have qualified under the exception,23 that the
Ninth Circuit had erred in treating the Hosanna-Tabor factors as necessary
elements of a checklist,24 and that the First Amendment bars the adjudication of
such employment-discrimination claims.25
Based on the great level of discretion given to lower courts, now made
broader by the Supreme Court,26 it may become more difficult to contain

16
Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205; Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 661; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &
Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 198 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
17
Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205 (giving little to no weight to title); Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 661 (noting that at
most two Hosanna-Tabor factors were satisfied, and that function outweighed the more formalistic factors);
Biel, 911 F.3d at 608 (adopting a reasonable construction in balancing function and title); Morrissey-Berru v.
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., No. 17-56624, 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019) (requiring satisfaction of
both function and title).
18
See supra note 17.
19
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
20
Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 460.
21
Id.
22
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2055–58 (2020).
23
Id. at 2066–67.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 2069.
26
Id. at 2071–72 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

BARRICK_12.2.20

470

12/3/2020 1:17 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:465

application of the ministerial exception to employees who serve the core
religious purpose of the employer. The range of employees to whom the
ministerial exception has been extended demonstrates the broad and perhaps
improper application of the exception, which will only be furthered by the
Court’s decision in Morrissey-Berru. This broad application is particularly
evident in cases involving teachers who have been tasked with teaching a secular
subject, but who also have religious duties ranging from minor to predominant.
While presumably a teacher with negligible religious duties should be
differentiated from a teacher with significant and constant religious duties, many
courts have not taken this approach, in part due to the subjectivity of what the
religious employer itself would consider to be negligible versus significant and
courts’ fear of intruding on church autonomy in that expectation. Balancing facts
in whichever way they see fit, courts have expanded the definition of “minister,”
and the lack of clear guidance by the Supreme Court prior to Morrissey-Berru
and ambiguity in the statutory language permitted this expansion. The
ministerial exception by its nature provides great freedom to religious employers
in their employment decisions,27 and courts have been extremely deferential to
this freedom, tending to favor the religious employer.28 While religious freedom
is a positive and key tenet of the Constitution,29 it cannot be extended so far as
to impinge entirely on more recent—but also key—principles and rights, such
as freedom from discrimination. Therefore, rather than broaden the exception
even further, as was done in Morrissey-Berru, the test set forth by HosannaTabor must be better defined to contain its application to employees who are
ministerial to an extent that the exemption’s purpose is served. Thus, this
Comment proposes a solution that seeks to provide a clarified mode of analysis
that limits application of the ministerial exception to employees whose functions
are truly essential to fulfilling the religious mission of the employer.
Part I of this Comment provides the constitutional, statutory, and case law
background that led to Hosanna-Tabor, the decision and analysis of the Court
in Hosanna-Tabor, the lower courts’ interpretations of the four-factor test, and
the Supreme Court’s 2020 reinterpretation of Hosanna-Tabor. Part II discusses
the already proposed solutions to the criticized application of both the HosannaTabor factors and the ministerial exception in general. Finally, Part III proposes
a clarification of the four-factor analysis based on pre- and post-Hosanna-Tabor

27

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 210 (2d Cir. 2017); Grussgott v.
Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 2018); Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F.
Supp. 3d 177, 182 (2d Cir. 2016).
29
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28
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modes of analysis and based on the concerns raised by Hosanna-Tabor, the
dissent in Morrissey-Berru, and the ministerial exception as a whole.
I.

BACKGROUND TO THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION

The principles of religious freedom protected by the First Amendment were
key protections the founders sought to safeguard.30 Despite their fundamental
importance to the U.S. Constitution, there has been much debate as to how these
principles, namely freedom to exercise and freedom from establishment, should
be applied in cases involving religious institutions and their ministers.31 This
Part will serve as a primer to the most current discussion surrounding the
exception, in four sections. Section A discusses the history of the ministerial
exception. Section B analyzes Hosanna-Tabor, the case that elevated the
ministerial exception to a constitutional mandate. Section C examines the
current circuit splits regarding the application of Hosanna-Tabor, and how the
predictions of both the critics and champions of Hosanna-Tabor have come to
fruition in those cases. Finally, Section D addresses the Supreme Court’s most
recent decision surrounding the ministerial exception: Morrissey-Berru.
A. History of the Ministerial Exception
The ministerial exception has its roots in the First Amendment of the
Constitution32 and has been further informed by statute,33 along with various
cases.34 As it exists today, the exemption is understood to allow a religious
institution to hire or fire their “ministers” free from interference by the state,
even if those decisions violate state or federal antidiscrimination laws.35 A
secular court’s involvement is limited to determining whether the employee
bringing a claim is a “minister” and therefore covered by the exemption.36 This
section will first address the statutory basis for the exception, followed by the
constitutional bases for the exception and the resulting case law.

30
JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT
41 (4th ed. 2016).
31
Id. at 235–38.
32
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
34
See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972); Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of SeventhDay Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169–71 (4th Cir. 1985); Alcazar v. Corp. of the Cath. Archbishop of Seattle,
627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 2010).
35
See, e.g., McClure, 460 F.2d at 553; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169–71; Alcazar, 627 F.3d at 1292.
36
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012).
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1. Statutory Basis
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 “prohibits employers with more than fifteen
employees from discriminating on the basis of religion.”37 However, section 702
of Title VII of the Act provides that this prohibition does not apply to “any
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society” that hires
individuals of the associated religion to perform work connected with the
activities of that religion.38 The exemption to section 702 was upheld in 1987 by
the Court in Presiding Bishop v. Amos.39 In Amos, a building engineer for a
gymnasium subunit of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was
terminated because he failed to meet the qualifications for membership in the
church.40 The employee brought a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
alleging discrimination on the basis of religion.41 The Church defended its
decision based on section 702 of Title VII.42 The employee engineer argued that
section 702 did not apply and claimed that if section 702 was construed to permit
religious discrimination by religious employers against employees in
nonreligious positions, it would violate the Establishment Clause and
unjustifiably favor religion.43 The Court, however, disagreed with the
employee’s argument.44 It held that “applying section 702’s exemption to
religious organizations’ secular activities does not violate the Establishment
Clause,”45 and that applying the section 702 exemption is “not unconstitutional
simply because it allows churches to advance religion” as long as the
government has not itself “advanced religion through its own activities and
influence.”46 Such “benevolent neutrality” serves the “permissible legislative
purpose . . . [of] alleviat[ing] significant governmental interference with the
ability of religious institutions to define and carry out their religious missions.”47

37

WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 234.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1; see WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 234.
39
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,
339 (1985).
40
Id. at 330.
41
Id. at 331.
42
Id.
43
Id.; see WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 235.
44
Amos, 483 U.S. at 339.
45
Id. at 336.
46
Id. at 337 (stating that government interference that advances religion through its own activities and
influence is the type of interference that would have the forbidden “effects” set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), which applied a three-part test to determine whether a challenged law serves a “secular
legislative purpose”).
47
Id. at 334, 335 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
38
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While section 702 ensures a primarily religious institution’s ability to choose
its employees, it “only allows such organizations to favor employees who share
their religion” and does not address discrimination on any other basis.48 Section
702 thus provides background to the development of the ministerial exception,
but it does not provide an answer to the question of who qualifies as a minister
and whether religious institutions could discriminate on bases other than religion
itself. The ministerial exception, therefore, built upon the exemption from Title
VII and developed further in response to Title VII’s ambiguities.49
2. Constitutional Bases in Pre-Hosanna-Tabor Case Law
A constitutional justification for the ministerial exception based on the First
Amendment arose for the first time in 1972, when the Fifth Circuit articulated
that the ministerial exception, as an exemption to Title VII, applied in instances
of discrimination outside of just religious discrimination.50 The holding in
McClure v. Salvation Army51 arose out of allegations of gender discrimination
asserted by McClure, a female minister, against her employer, the Salvation
Army Church.52 McClure alleged that she had received a lower salary and fewer
benefits than her male counterparts, and that she had been discharged because
of her complaints to superiors and to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).53 The Salvation Army moved to dismiss, claiming that it
was covered by the religious exemption of Title VII.54 Agreeing with the
Salvation Army, the court reasoned that applying Title VII to the employment
relationship between church and minister would require an investigation into
church practices, even if administrative, chipping at the wall of separation
between church and state.55 To allow such regulation by the government would
unconstitutionally impinge on the religious freedom guaranteed by the First
Amendment.56 Therefore, the court determined that, despite the unspecific
wording of section 702 of Title VII, “Congress did not intend . . . to regulate the
employment relationship between church and minister.”57 McClure thus
extended the Title VII exemption to cases of employment discrimination outside

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 234.
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id.
Id. at 558, 560.
Id. at 555.
Id.
Id. at 555–56.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 560–61.
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the realm of religion.58 Thereafter, every lower federal court adopted McClure’s
interpretation of the ministerial exception, extending it to cases of employment
discrimination based on race, gender, age, and disability, and calling on the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment for support.59
Subsequent case law built upon the constitutional and statutory ministerial
exception to develop standards to answer resulting ambiguities surrounding the
exception. One early test was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Starkman v. Evans
in 1999,60 and it was later followed by courts in the Second and Seventh
Circuits.61 The test called for the consideration of several factors to determine
whether an employee qualified as a minister within the meaning of the
exception, and it was articulated in three parts.62 First, Starkman, which involved
the employment of a Choirmaster and Director of Music at a Methodist church,
required an examination of the hiring criteria.63 Second, it required consideration
of the employee’s qualifications and authorization to “perform the ceremonies
of the Church.”64 Last, it looked to whether the employee engaged in

58

Id.
Rockwell v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese, 02-239-M, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20992, at *8–9 (1st Cir.
Oct. 30, 2002) (gender); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2008) (race); Petruska v. Gannon
Univ., 1:04-cv-80, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54884, at *24–26 (3d. Cir. Mar. 31, 2008) (gender); Rayburn v. Gen.
Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169–71 (4th Cir. 1985) (gender and race); Starkman v. Evans,
198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) (disability); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225–26 (6th Cir.
2007) (disability); EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 776–77 (6th
Cir. 2010) (disability); Tomic v. Cath. Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039–41 (7th Cir. 2006) (age); McNeil
v. Missouri Ann. Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 2-10-cv-04154-NKL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98184,
at *10–12 (8th Cir. Sept. 20, 2010) (disability); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir.
1982) (gender); Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2010) (gender
and age); Ross v. Metro. Church of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (race); EEOC v. Cath.
Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (gender).
60
Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176–77.
61
See Tomic, 442 F.3d at 1039–41; Musante v. Notre Dame of Easton Church, No. 3:01CV2352(MRK),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5611, at *15–18 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2004).
62
Starkman, 198 F.3d at 176–77.
63
Id. at 176. For example, was the hiring decision based upon the employee’s religious background and
experience, and upon the employee’s ability to apply that experience to the position in question? Here, to be
qualified for her role, the employee was required to have a master’s degree in music and “extensive course work
in Church Music in Theory and Practice, Choral Conducting, Worship, Choral Vocal Methods, Hymnology,
Bible, Theology, Christian Education, and United Methodist History, Doctrine and Polity.” Id. The job
description for her position stated, “[T]he Director of Music is responsible for the planning, recruiting,
implementing and evaluating of music and congregational participation in all aspects of the ministry at [the
Church].” Id. The parties also did not dispute that religious music played an important role in the spiritual mission
of the church. Id.
64
Id. Here, the court found that the employee’s duties of planning worship liturgy, “coordinat[ing] church
and worship activities relating to the church’s Music Ministry,” rehearsing and conducting choirs, hiring
“musicians and lower level music ministry directors, and writing articles about the church’s Music Ministry for
the weekly church bulletin” made her “qualified and authorized to perform the ceremonies of the church.” Id.
59
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traditionally ecclesiastical or religious activities, “including whether [she]
‘attend[ed] to the religious needs of the faithful.’”65 The Starkman test asked
clear questions to guide this analysis of ministerial status—clarity missing from
some later cases that feared too much government involvement could arise from
a court’s determination of what qualifies as “traditionally ecclesiastical or
religious.”66
While the three-part Starkman test guided the Fifth, Second, and Seventh
Circuits, the Second Circuit also recognized a sliding-scale analysis, referenced
in Rweyemamu v. Cote, to determine whether an employee was a minister who
fit within the exception.67 While the “sliding-scale” approach was only later
applied in Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hospital, Rweyemamu was the first case to
bring forth the idea.68 The court in Rweyemamu held that a priest was barred
under the statutory ministerial exception from bringing a race discrimination
claim against his diocese and bishop.69 While not the foundation of the court’s
holding, the court recognized the “sliding-scale” and noted that “the more
‘pervasively religious’ the relationship between an employee and his employer,
the more salient the free exercise concern becomes.”70 Thus, the more religious
an employer institution is, the less religious an employee’s role must be to
qualify as a minister; the more religious an employee’s role is, the less religious
the employer institution need be.71 Through applying this scale, the court
clarified that, while it believed courts should consider an employee’s function
over his or her title or ordination status, that function test alone was “too rigid”
an approach as it “failed to consider the nature of the dispute.”72
65
Id. at 176 (quoting EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980)). In Starkman, the employee
claimed that “she [had been] designated to be a ‘ministerial presence’ to ailing parishioners on occasion” and
that “for her and her congregation, music constitutes a form of prayer that is an integral part of worship services
and Scripture readings.” Id. at 176; see EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 285 (5th Cir.
Unit A July 1981) (noting that traditionally ecclesiastical or religious tasks are those that are “essential to the
propagation of [the church’s] doctrine”).
66
Starkman, 198 F.3d at 175 (quoting Sw. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284).
67
Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F. Supp. 3d 177, 182 (2d Cir. 2016) (first framing the analysis as a
“sliding-scale”); Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination
in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1514, 1539–40 (1979)); Bagni, supra (introducing the idea of what came to be called the sliding-scale
analysis stemming from the idea that there is a “spiritual epicenter” of a church, “which must be outside the
scope of civil regulation because otherwise there would invariably be too great an infringement of free-exercise
rights[;]” however, once the church “acts outside this epicenter and moves closer to the purely secular world, it
subjects itself to secular regulation proportionate to the degree of secularity of its activities and relationships”).
68
Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 208 (citing Bagni, supra note 67, at 1514); Penn, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 182.
69
Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d at 200, 210.
70
Id. at 208 (citing Bagni, supra note 67, at 1514).
71
Id.
72
Id. The court also stated that even a discrimination suit by a lay employee could interfere with the
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The most widely applied test prior to 2012 was the “primary duties test” set
forth by the Fourth Circuit in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists and later adopted by the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.73 This
test stated that, “as a general rule, if the employee’s primary duties consist of
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious
order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she
should be considered ‘clergy.’”74 This analysis also involves a determination of
whether a “position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the
church.”75 Other circuits, though not expressly, adopted a version of the
“primary duties” test, which interpreted primary duties in the following manner:
if an employee’s duties are primarily religious in relation to his or her duties as
a whole, that employee will be considered a minister; if the employee’s duties
are not primarily religious, that employee is not a minister.76 Both interpretations
Constitution if the relationship was so “pervasively religious” that judicial interference could “run afoul of the
Constitution.” Id.
73
Rayburn v. Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985); accord
Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1243–44 (10th Cir. 2010); EEOC v. HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir. 2010); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare,
Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007); Ross v. Metro. Church of God, 471 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (N.D. Ga.
2007). Rayburn derived this “primary duties test” from the same Columbia Law Review article Rweyemamu
referenced. See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Bagni, supra note 67, at 1545. Some circuits, such as the Ninth,
declined to adopt any uniform test of “general applicability” and instead applied a “reasonable construction of
the ministerial exception.” Alcazar v. Corp. of the Cath. Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir.
2010). In Alcazar, the court cites to a prior Ninth Circuit case to support its holding. Id. at 1291. In EEOC v.
Pacific Press Publishing Ass’n, the court analogized to a Fifth Circuit case in which the employee, a secretary,
was “insufficiently like a minister to trigger the exception” as her role “did not ‘go to the heart of the church’s
function in the manner of a minister or a seminary teacher’ and . . . was not the type of critically sensitive position
within the church that McClure sought to protect.’” 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (1982) (citing EEOC v. Sw. Baptist
Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283–85 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)). In Alcazar, the plaintiff “affirmatively
allege[d] he was a seminarian,” and “under any reasonable construction of the ministerial exception,” he met the
definition of a minister. 627 F.3d at 1292. The facts demonstrated a position of the sort McClure sought to protect
and was in stark contrast with the secretarial position at issue in Pacific Press. Therefore, the court determined
it was unnecessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the scope of the ministerial exception. Id.
74
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Bagni, supra note 67, at 1545). In Rayburn, the court found that
the following duties of the employee, an associate in pastoral care, were primarily religious: “the associate in
pastoral care at [the Church] was pastoral advisor to the Sabbath School that introduces children to the life of
the church,” led Bible study groups, served as a counselor and pastor to the singles group as liaison between the
church and those receiving its message, led the congregation in services and solemn rites, and occasionally
preached from the pulpit. Id. at 1168. The court also discussed the sensitivity requirements of the position, and
the presumptive need people have for spiritual leadership when they turn to a pastor for help—engaging in what
may be too ecclesiastical for the Hosanna-Tabor Court. Id.
75
Id. at 1169.
76
Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362–63 (8th Cir. 1991); Redhead
v. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 440 F. Supp. 2d. 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). In Redhead, the court found that a
teacher who taught one hour of Bible study each day, attended worship services with her students, but otherwise
taught purely secular subjects, was not a minister. Redhead, 440 F. Supp. 2d. at 221; see also Katherine Hinkle,
Comment, What’s in a Name? The Definition of “Minister” in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
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of the “primary duties” test provided a fairly clear mode of analysis—the
employee is a minister if either (1) religious duties outweigh secular duties; or
(2) the employee’s duties consist of those laid out in Rayburn, and the
employee’s role is of spiritual or pastoral importance to the church’s mission.77
The “primary duties” test implies in name a balancing of secular and religious
duties in some manner, and it places its entire emphasis on function.
B. Hosanna-Tabor and Its Reception
In the 2012 case Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, the Supreme Court made the
ministerial exception a constitutional command and set forth an analytical
framework by which to determine when an employee qualifies as a minister for
purposes of the exception.78 Hosanna-Tabor arose after respondent Cheryl
Perich, a “called”79 teacher at Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and
School, was terminated for what she alleged was retaliation for threatening to
file an ADA claim.80 Hosanna-Tabor hired Perich as a “called” teacher after she
had completed her training, upon which Perich was “designat[ed as] a
commissioned minister.”81 Her duties included teaching secular subjects,
teaching a religion class, leading her students in daily prayer and devotional
exercises, taking her students to a weekly school-wide chapel service, and
leading the chapel service about twice a year.82 After five years of teaching at
Hosanna-Tabor, Perich developed narcolepsy and spent the first part of the
2004–05 school year on disability leave.83 She alerted the school in January 2005
that she would be able to return the following month.84 The school notified
Perich that her position had been filled by a lay teacher for the remainder of the
and Sch. v. EEOC, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 305–07 (2013) (citing Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169). But
see Clapper v. Chesapeake Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 97-2648, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 32554 (4th
Cir. 1998) (focusing on the employee’s primary duties in the context of the school’s overall religious purpose,
rather than the amount of time spent on religious and secular duties each day, respectively, and holding that an
employee who taught elementary school, led students in prayer, conducted ten minutes of worship daily, and
taught Bible study was a minister fulfilling the goal of the church).
77
Scharon, 929 F.2d at 362–63; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Clapper, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 32554, at
*18–21; Ross, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 1311.
78
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 173 (2012).
79
The school in Hosanna-Tabor classifies its teachers as either “called” or “lay.” The court explains,
“‘[c]alled’ teachers are regarded as having been called to their vocation by God. To be eligible . . . a teacher
must complete certain academic requirements, including a course of theological study. Once called, a teacher
receives the formal title ‘Minister of Religion, Commissioned.’” Id. at 177. A lay teacher does not require said
training and need not be Lutheran, but generally performs the same duties as a called teacher. Id.
80
Id. at 179.
81
Id. at 178.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
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school year, expressed concern that Perich was not ready to reassume her role,
and offered to pay a portion of Perich’s health insurance premiums in exchange
for her resignation as a “called” teacher.85 Perich refused this offer, instead
reporting to school and refusing to leave until she received written
documentation stating that she had returned to work.86 The principal then
informed Perich she would likely be fired.87
Perich subsequently stated her intent to assert her legal rights, and she was
soon terminated for “insubordination and disruptive behavior” along with the
“damage she had done to her ‘working relationship’ with the school by
‘threatening to take legal action.’”88 The foregoing violated the church’s
requirement for internal dispute resolution—a requirement core to Lutheran
Church doctrine.89 Perich then filed a charge with the EEOC claiming retaliatory
termination in violation of the ADA, and the EEOC brought suit against
Hosanna-Tabor.90 Hosanna-Tabor argued that, based on the ministerial
exception, this suit was barred.91 The district court agreed and granted summary
judgment for Hosanna-Tabor.92 However, the Sixth Circuit vacated and
remanded, holding that Perich did not qualify as a minister under the exception.93
Both the district court and Sixth Circuit court applied the primary duties test in
their analyses, but the Sixth Circuit contended that the district court had erred in
its legal conclusion relying on Perich’s title.94
By granting certiorari, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the
issues of whether the ministerial exception was implicated in an employment
discrimination suit, and if so, what the analytical framework should be when
applying the exception.95 The Court held that the exception was implicated, as
the present case “concern[ed] government interference with an internal church
decision that affect[ed] the faith and mission of the church itself.”96 It also

85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id.
Id. at 178–79.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 179–80.
Id. at 180.
EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 892 (E.D. Mich.

2008).
93

EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 782 (6th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 778–81.
95
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.
96
Id. at 190. Contra Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding
that government regulation of outward, physical acts done for sacramental purpose but in violation of “a valid
and neutral law of general applicability” was permitted). Here, while the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation is “a
94

BARRICK_12.2.20

2020]

12/3/2020 1:17 PM

THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION

479

looked to the purpose of the exception in Title VII in support of its holding that
the exception applied, noting that
requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or
punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere
employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal
governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the
selection of those who will personify its beliefs . . . infring[ing] the
Free Exercise Clause . . . [and] the Establishment Clause.97

The Court made clear its reluctance to infringe, in any way, on internal church
decision-making in fear of infringing on the church’s First Amendment rights.98
It reasoned that the risk of infringement calls for the application of the
ministerial exception.99
This case affirmed that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses support the ministerial exception.100 The Free Exercise
Clause, the Court held, protects “a religious group’s right to shape its own faith
and mission through its appointments,”101 and prevents the state from interfering
with a religious group’s freedom to select its own ministers.102 Thus, by
imposing an unwanted minister on a religious organization, the state infringes
on the Free Exercise Clause.103 Demonstrating the weight of this right, the
Supreme Court noted in Sherbert v. Verner that “only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests” could justify infringement by the government
on an individual’s free exercise of religion.104 Sherbert established that not only
would a law that discriminates on the basis of religion violate the Free Exercise
Clause, but so, too, would “purely secular legislation [such as the ADA] that
imposes unintended burdens upon the free exercise of religion.”105
The Establishment Clause states that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.”106 In the context of a religious

valid and neutral law of general applicability,” the case is distinct because it concerns internal church affairs.
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
97
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 184.
101
Id. at 188.
102
Id. at 184.
103
Id. at 188.
104
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
105
Hinkle, supra note 76, at 291 n.37.
106
U.S. CONST. amend. I. In Amos, the Court held that a ministerial exception under section 702 did not
violate the Establishment Clause after the employee argued it did so by unjustifiably favoring religion. Corp. of
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institution and its employees, Hosanna-Tabor stated that the Establishment
Clause “prevents the Government from appointing ministers.”107 The Court
stated that if it applied antidiscrimination laws to religious organizations, it
would in turn give “the state the power to determine which individuals will
minister to the faithful.”108 Such would be an act of “ecclesiastical decision[making]” in violation of the Establishment Clause.109
The EEOC argued that Hosanna-Tabor’s strongly discretionary approach
diverged from precedent set in Employment Division v. Smith, a 1990 case that
called for weak neutrality regarding the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses.110 Smith weakened the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses by
deviating from the strict level of scrutiny set forth in Sherbert.111 The Smith
Court held the ADA to be a “valid and neutral law of general applicability and
therefore applicable to the Church, even if it imposed a ‘substantial burden’ on
the Church school’s operation.”112 While the Court in Smith held, consistent with
prior cases, that an individual cannot claim a religious exemption from general
criminal laws, it went further in shaping the standard of review to be used in free
exercise cases.113 Smith represented a shift from the strict protection of religious
liberty to a weak neutrality approach.114
Contrary to the approach in Smith, Hosanna-Tabor set a precedent of strong
deference to religious institutions in their decisions to terminate employees for
any reason, and it held that a secular court cannot question those reasons.115 In
response to the EEOC, the Court distinguished the two cases to justify its
divergence from Smith, which otherwise may not have supported holding in
favor of such strong religious deference. 116 All nine justices unanimously agreed
that there was a “ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses of the
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987).
107
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184.
108
Id. at 188–89.
109
Id.; WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 223, 237.
110
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
111
Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877–78 (1990).
112
WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 237. In Smith, an individual’s ingestion of peyote as a sacramental
religious practice neither prohibited the termination of his employment, nor his disqualification from state
unemployment compensation. Id. (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 877–79).
113
Id. at 147.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 237–38 (explaining that the reason for termination need not be religious).
116
Id. at 237; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012).
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court stated that, while Smith “involved government regulation of ‘outward physical
acts’ (ingesting peyote) . . . the Hosanna-Tabor facts concerned ‘an internal church decision that affects the faith
and mission of the church itself.’” Id. By making this distinction, the Court justified giving a different level of
deference to religious institutions in cases like Hosanna-Tabor than in cases like Smith.
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First Amendment,” and that a court’s involvement in employment
discrimination suits against religious institutions was limited to a nonecclesiastical analysis of whether the employee is a “minister.”117
After determining the applicability of the ministerial exception, the Court
proceeded to analyze the specific facts of the case.
1. Analytical Framework
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor set forth a four-part test to determine whether
an employee is a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception: (1) whether
the religious institution held the employee out as a minister; (2) whether the
employee’s title reflected a certain degree of religious training; (3) whether the
employee used the title and held herself out to be a minister; and (4) whether the
employee’s job duties reflected a role in conveying and carrying out the mission
of the church.118 The Court declined to adopt a “rigid formula” and instead called
for consideration of all the circumstances of Perich’s employment.119 The
resulting test takes into account both the title and function of the employee in
question, the first three factors falling under the category of “title” and the fourth
under “function.”120 This subsection conducts a detailed discussion of each part
to clarify the factors under consideration, and later analyzes whether their
application by lower courts has achieved the Supreme Court’s purpose or
whether they require further definition.
First, the Court asked whether the religious institution held the employee out
as a minister.121 Here, Hosanna-Tabor did hold Perich out to be a minister—with
a role distinct from most of its members—in the following ways: Hosanna-Tabor
issued Perich a “diploma of vocation” entitling her “Minister of Religion,
Commissioned”; it tasked Perich with performing her office “according to the
Word of God and the confessional standards of the Evangelical Lutheran Church
as drawn from the Sacred Scriptures”; the congregation prayed for her
“ministrations” to be blessed by God; and the congregation periodically
reviewed Perich’s ministerial skills and responsibilities and provided for her
continuing education.122

117
118
119
120
121
122

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190; WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 236.
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191–92.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 191.
Id.
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Second, the Court looked to the employee’s title and asked whether that title
reflected a certain degree of religious training.123 Here, the Court held that
Perich’s title as “Minister of Religion, Commissioned” did reflect “a significant
degree of religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning.”124
It so held because “to become a commissioned minister, Perich had to complete
eight college-level courses in subjects including biblical interpretation, church
doctrine, and the ministry of the Lutheran teacher.”125 She was required to
petition for and obtain the endorsement of her local Synod,126 answer a series of
ministry-related questions, and pass an oral examination administered by a
Lutheran college faculty committee.127 It took Perich six years to fulfill these
requirements, and after fulfilling them, she was still only commissioned upon
election by the congregation in recognition of “God’s call to her to teach.”128
Thereafter, Perich could only have her call rescinded by “a supermajority vote
of the congregation—a protection designed to allow her to ‘preach the Word of
God boldly.’”129
Third, the Court looked to the employee’s own use of the title and asked
whether she held herself out as a minister.130 Here, Perich held herself out as a
minister of the church by accepting the formal call to religious service, “claiming
a special housing allowance on her taxes only available to employees earning
their compensation ‘in the exercise of the ministry,’” and indicating in a form
she submitted to the Synod after termination that she hoped to rejoin the teaching
ministry.131
Fourth, the Court looked to the employee’s job duties and asked whether
those duties reflected a role in conveying and carrying out the mission of the
church.132 Here, Perich was expressly charged with fulfilling the mission of the
church,133 and in doing so her responsibilities included teaching religion to her

123

Id.
Id. at 174.
125
Id. at 191.
126
A synod is a regional or national organization of Lutheran congregations. Synod, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/synod (last visited Nov. 20, 2020). Here, the term refers to the Missouri
Synod, the second-largest Lutheran denomination in America, of which Hosanna-Tabor is a member. HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 191.
127
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 192 (internal quotations omitted). Perich also stated, “I feel that God is leading me to serve in the
teaching ministry . . . I am anxious to be in the teaching ministry again soon.” Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. Perich was charged with “lead[ing] others toward Christian maturity” and “teach[ing] faithfully the
124
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students four days a week, leading them in prayer three times a day, taking them
to a school-wide chapel service once a week, leading and curating that service
about twice a year, and leading her students in brief devotional exercises each
morning.134 Based on the foregoing facts, the Court held that, “as a source of
religious instruction, Perich performed an important role in transmitting the
Lutheran faith to the next generation.”135
The Court found that Perich merited ministerial status under each of the four
factors of analysis: the Hosanna-Tabor church and school held her out to be a
minister, her title reflected ministerial status, she held herself out to be a
minister, and her job duties reflected ministerial function.136 Though not all four
factors were or are necessary for ministerial status to be found, the Court stated
they were all met here.137 Thus, the Court provided guidance to lower courts in
the form of a four-factor test, but did so in a manner so averse to rigidity that it
left lower courts with wide discretion to interpret as they saw fit.
2. Critics and Champions
Hosanna-Tabor evoked both support and criticism. Such a result did not take
long, beginning with Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor, which was
joined by Justice Kagan.138 While Justice Alito agreed with the Court’s opinion,
he addressed the complexity of the term “minister”139 and the variable
definitions of “ordination” among religions140—both of which complicate the
analysis set forth in Hosanna-Tabor.141 Further, he noted that some faiths
consider a large percentage of their members to be part of the ministry as a
whole, blurring any line of distinction among employees of the religious
institution.142 Justice Alito argued that, based on this wide variability, ordination
and title have not and should not be determinative of an employee’s status.143

Word of God, the Sacred Scripture, in its truth and purity and as set forth in all the symbolical books of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church.” Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 191–92.
138
Id. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring).
139
Id. (noting that the term “minister” is common in Protestant denominations to refer to members of their
clergy, but rarely used among other religious groups, such as Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists).
140
Id. (noting that ordination has similar significance in most Christian churches and Judaism, but no
counterpart in some Christian denominations and other religions).
141
Id.
142
Id. at 202.
143
Id. Justice Alito also cites to EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. Unit
A July 1981), to exemplify the longstanding standard that formal ordination is not necessary for the ministerial
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Rather, the ministerial exception should apply to
[a] general category of ‘employees’ whose functions are essential to
the independence of practically all religious groups . . . includ[ing]
those who serve in positions of leadership . . . perform important
functions in worship services and in the performance of religious
ceremonies and rituals, and those who are entrusted with teaching and
conveying the tenets of the faith to the next generation.144

If the religious institution finds that such an employee is no longer able to
perform these key religious functions, then the institution has the right to remove
the employee with the protections of the First Amendment.145 Justice Alito
aimed to make clear that it was Perich’s religious function, rather than her
ordination status, that made her the type of employee a church must be free to
appoint or dismiss under the First Amendment and who is subject to the internal
dispute resolution doctrine of the Lutheran Church.146
Justice Thomas also concurred in the decision in Hosanna-Tabor, but for a
different reason than Justices Alito and Kagan.147 He expressed a fear that
judicial creation of any multifactor analysis or test would disadvantage religions
“whose beliefs, practices, and membership are outside of the ‘Mainstream’ or
unpalatable to some” and possibly pressure religious groups to “conform its
beliefs and practices regarding ‘ministers’ to the prevailing secular
understanding” out of fear of liability.148 Thus, he argued, evidence
demonstrating that a religious organization sincerely considers an employee to
be a minister should be sufficient to conclude the employee is covered by the
ministerial exception.149
One scholarly criticism of the Hosanna-Tabor test is that the Supreme
Court’s decision fails to provide adequate guidance to lower courts, paving the
way for “excessive entanglement with religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause.”150 Such entanglement could arise if lower courts have to delve too
deeply into specific religious beliefs and doctrines to determine whether an
employee plays a role in worship or faith-spreading that merits ministerial

exception to apply. Lower courts, he argues, should keep “an eye toward the function of the position,” the label
serving as “merely a shorthand.” WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 238.
144
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring).
145
Id. at 199.
146
Id. at 206.
147
Id. at 196–98 (Thomas, J., concurring).
148
Id. at 197.
149
Id. at 197–98.
150
Hinkle, supra note 76, at 337.
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function status.151 Another argument criticizes the Supreme Court’s rejection of
the primary duties test through an overemphasis on the importance of title152 and
a lack of balancing between religious and secular duties.153 Hosanna-Tabor
deviated from the primary duties test, noting that even if secular duties occupy
more time than religious duties, some religious duty combined with title or
outward representation can indicate “minister.”154 The variation among circuits
regarding which factors weigh heaviest has led to inconsistent application of the
test among different courts in cases with similar facts.155
Finally, the Hosanna-Tabor decision represents a “shift in the prioritization
of the value of antidiscrimination laws.”156 Despite legislation demonstrating a
commitment to preventing discrimination, the Court indicated a deeper
commitment to religious freedom.157 In turn, this shift could lead to increased
discrimination against employees of religious institutions—a concern raised by
scholars and religious leaders alike.158 Fear of excessive entanglement gave rise
to the prioritization of religious freedom over antidiscrimination law, likely
creating pressure to follow precedent that will percolate throughout the lower
courts.159 The failure to better define the standard for who is a minister therefore
arises again: in seeking to conform with precedent, lower courts may tend to side
with the religious institution over the employee due to the unclear class of
covered individuals.160 If this is the case, perhaps the goals of flexibility
announced with the test are not being properly served.
Not all reactions to the test set forth by Hosanna-Tabor were negative. One
argument in its favor comes from Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, where
the Fifth Circuit stated that the lack of any bright line test makes room for
151

Id.
Id. at 335–36; see also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S at 200 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that, while title
is relevant, function is more probative in the analysis).
153
Hinkle, supra note 76, at 335–36.
154
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 193.
155
See Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2018); Biel v. St. James
Sch., 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018); infra Part I.C.4.
156
Hinkle, supra note 76, at 342.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 343; John H. Cushman Jr., Religious Groups Greet Ruling with Satisfaction, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
11, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/us/hosanna-tabor-ruling-welcomed-by-religious-groups.html?
_r=4&. Reverend Barry W. Lynn—executive Director of Americans United for Separation of Church and
State—expressed fear that the Court’s ruling would make it more difficult to combat “blatant discrimination.”
Id. Similarly, Professor Paul Horwitz of the University of Alabama School of Law deemed it our “scholarly and
moral obligation to think about what happens next . . . [to] acknowledge[] the dangers as well as the value of
church autonomy.” Id.
159
Hinkle, supra note 76, at 343.
160
Id. at 345.
152
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religious pluralism, whereas a more rigid test would stifle lower courts’ abilities
to recognize differences among religions.161 This argument champions the
ability of lower courts to consider religious polity to determine whether an
employee has a function that is key to faith-spreading and worship, instead of
disparaging such consideration as “excessive entanglement.”162 Law professors
Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle also offer a defense of Hosanna-Tabor.163 They both
acknowledge and embrace the “expected” variations in lower courts’ application
of the Hosanna-Tabor test.164 Further, they laud the Court’s consistency with
the Establishment Clause and its “long-standing constitutional commitment to
sharply delimit the state’s involvement with religion and religious
institutions.”165 Finally, many religious and religious liberty groups championed
the Court’s holding as a “huge victory for religious freedom.”166 Professor Marci
A. Hamilton of Cardozo School of Law expressed relief that the holding was
applied narrowly to discrimination suits, thereby rejecting potential claims by
religious institutions that they have complete autonomy even in sexual
harassment cases.167 Nathan Diament of the Orthodox Union, an organization
which had “joined in an amicus brief with the U.S. Conference of Catholic
Bishops, the Mormon Church, and the [P]residing [B]ishop of the Episcopal
Church,” also expressed appreciation for the “expansive freedom of religion”
this decision preserved.168
It is most likely that Hosanna-Tabor has had both positive and negative
effects, resulting precisely from the reasons set forth by its critics and its
champions. In the years following Hosanna-Tabor, courts have consistently
applied the factors set forth by Hosanna-Tabor itself, provided for by the test’s
flexibility.169 What courts have not done, however, is apply these factors
consistently with one another.170 Courts have tended to favor the religious
employer in these cases, whether as a result of a precedential pressure for which
161

Cannata v. Cath. Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2012).
Hinkle, supra note 76, at 337.
163
See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1280 (2017).
164
Id. at 1288.
165
Id. at 1280.
166
Cushman, supra note 158.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
See Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2017); Aparicio v. Christian
Union, Inc., 18-CV-0592(ALC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019); Grussgott v.
Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2018); Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir.
2018).
170
See Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205; Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 661; Biel, 911 F.3d at 608; Morrissey-Berru v.
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019).
162
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critics have expressed concern or merely based on the facts of each individual
case.171 Discretion and flexibility have allowed courts to delineate their own
interpretations and their own methods of analysis. The main concern is that
flexibility often yields uncertainty: uncertainty in the scope of the exception,
uncertainty in weight given to each factor under consideration, and uncertainty
in whether the four factors must be considered at all. The following cases
illustrate this wide variability in applying the Hosanna-Tabor factors.
C. Circuit Splits—How Courts Have Adapted the Vague Hosanna-Tabor
Analysis
For better or worse, the Court’s flexible, four-part Hosanna-Tabor test has
led lower courts to determine largely for themselves how to balance the factors
under consideration. Whether lower court interpretations and analyses can be
characterized as “excessive entanglement” rather than fulfilling the needs of a
pluralistic society is questionable, and arguments can be made for both.172 It is
also unclear whether courts have felt pressure to prioritize religious freedom and
favor the employer based on the results of Hosanna-Tabor or whether the facts
of these cases have truly tended to favor the employer.173 What is certain,
however, is that lower courts have applied the test in a variety of ways, often
inconsistently with one another. The inconsistencies among and debates within
circuits indicate that the Hosanna-Tabor tests should be better defined to allow
plaintiffs the same chance of success regardless of jurisdiction, despite the risks
of rigidity the Court sought to avoid.
1. Overview of Varied Analyses
The four-factor test enumerated in Hosanna-Tabor has been pared down to
two main elements for consideration: title and function.174 The first three
factors—whether the religious institution held the employee out as a minister,
whether the employee used the title, and whether the employee held herself or
himself out to be a minister—fall under “title” more generally. The employee’s
job duties and whether those duties reflected a role in conveying and carrying
out the mission of the church fall under “function.” While the Supreme Court
indicated that an employee’s title is not determinative and that an employee’s
secular duties, among religious duties, do not detract from ministerial status, it
171
172

See Fratello, 863 F.3d 190; Aparicio, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938; Grussgott, 882 F.3d 655.
See Cannata v. Cath. Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 2012); Hinkle, supra note 76, at

302.
173
174

See Hinkle, supra note 76, at 283, 343.
See Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205; Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 658, 661.
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did not provide lower courts with a clear standard by which to balance the
factors.175 Thus, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have formed
their own interpretations and balancing tests within the scope of the HosannaTabor analysis, leading up to the 2020 Supreme Court case: Morrissey-Berru.176
2. The Second Circuit
One addition the Second Circuit has made to the Hosanna-Tabor analysis is
its earlier idea of a sliding scale, where “the more religious the employer
institution is, the less religious the employee’s functions must be to qualify [as
a minister],” and vice versa.177 Nowhere in Hosanna-Tabor was such a scale
proposed. Rather, this sliding scale idea stems from the pre-Hosanna-Tabor
Second Circuit precedent in Rweyemamu,178 which the Second Circuit applied
in Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hospital to determine that the ministerial exception
applied to a “pervasively religious”179 employee in the context of his almost
entirely secular employer.180 In Penn, the court, on a motion for summary
judgment, did not question its earlier finding that the employee chaplain was a
minister for purposes of the exception.181 The employee’s role was “pervasively
religious,” as he worked in the Department of Pastoral Care and was responsible
for ministry to patients and their families.182 The hospital was a “nonsectarian”183 institution; however, it maintained a connection with the United
Methodist Church, and its mission statement “emphasize[d] an ecumenical
program of pastoral care.”184 Thus, the court held that the hospital was acting as
a religious organization, even though it was in reality a secular institution.185

175
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 193 (2012) (noting that
even the “heads of congregations themselves often have a mix of duties, including secular ones such as helping
to manage the congregation’s finances, supervising purely secular personnel, and overseeing the upkeep of
facilities”).
176
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrisey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020).
177
Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., 18-CV-0592(ALC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *14 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2019) (citing Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F. Supp. 3d 177, 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2016)). Penn held
that a chaplain at a now-secular hospital was a minister for purposes of the exception because he had an
“exceedingly ministerial role,” he worked in the Department of Pastoral Care, and the hospital’s mission
statement “emphasize[d] an ‘ecumenical program of pastoral care.’” 158 F. Supp. 3d at 182, 184.
178
Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008).
179
Id. at 208.
180
Penn, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 182.
181
Id. at 181.
182
Id. at 179–82.
183
Id. at 178.
184
Id. at 184.
185
Id.
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Another standard that continues to permeate Second Circuit cases is the idea
that the “substance of [an] employee’s responsibilities . . . is far more important”
than title—an exaggerated version of Hosanna-Tabor’s majority holding.186 In
Fratello v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, the court held that the
principal of a Catholic school was a minister under the exception, though her
title was not “inherently religious,” and, as a woman, she could not have been
ordained in the Catholic Church.187 The court still found her to be a minister for
purposes of the ministerial exception based on the many religious functions she
performed to carry out the school’s religious mission, as well as her holding
herself out as a spiritual leader of the school.188 The Second Circuit has focused
“principally” on the functions of the employee, which it indicated was the
correct approach years earlier in Rweyemamu.189 It also interpreted HosannaTabor as an instruction “only as to what [courts] might take into account as
relevant, including the four considerations on which it relied; it neither limits the
inquiry to those considerations nor requires their application in every case.”190
Another Second Circuit case, Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., applied the
Hosanna-Tabor factors and acknowledged the sliding-scale approach, but,
significantly, decided against application of the ministerial exception.191 In
Aparicio, the employee alleged that his religious employer had a gender-biased
policy and that he was discriminatorily terminated for vocally opposing that
policy.192 The employee’s title was Director of Public Affairs, but preemployment documents stated he was “part of a ministry,” and his offer letter
stated that the employer was “seeking employees who view their work as a
calling.”193 The employee claimed he was not required to complete any rigorous
religious training to be considered for the position, and he only completed a

186
Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 207 (2d Cir. 2017). Hosanna-Tabor did
not specify what weight should be given to each factor under consideration. However, Justice Alito argued that
Perich’s functional importance was the most important consideration, while the other factors were probative but
not determinative. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 206 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
187
Fratello, 863 F.3d at 210; see Angela Giuffrida, ‘Save Catholic Church’ by Lifting Ban on Female
Priests, Activists Say, GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2019, 1:23 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/22/
catholic-church-lift-ban-on-female-priests-activists-say (“[T]he topic of [women] becoming priests is still very
much taboo.”).
188
Fratello, 863 F.3d at 208–10.
189
Id. at 202.
190
Id. at 204–05.
191
Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., 18-CV-0592(ALC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *14–19
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019).
192
Id. at *4–5.
193
Id. at *14–15.
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required training on theological topics that he claimed were irrelevant to him.194
Functionally, the employee’s job duties focused solely on raising funds for the
organization and dealing with donors, and such was set forth in his offer letter.195
Based on the facts of the case and under the four Hosanna-Tabor factors, the
court found that the employee was not a minister.196 The court placed little to no
emphasis on the employee’s secular title, nor on the fact that his pre-employment
documents explicitly stated he was joining a ministry.197 After finding the facts
insufficient to make a conclusion on the second two factors, the court based its
final decision on Fratello’s interpretation of the Hosanna-Tabor test, focusing
on the fourth factor—function—as the most important consideration, and held
that the employee did not satisfy it and was therefore not a minister.198 Aparicio
involved a more clearly secular employee, making the analysis slightly easier
than in Fratello or in the following cases.
3. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit has taken a less extreme approach than the Second Circuit,
acknowledging that the determination of ministerial status should be a balance
between function and title, while simultaneously indicating what that balance
should be more clearly than Hosanna-Tabor. In Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian
Fellowship, the Sixth Circuit employed a reasonable approach based on
Hosanna-Tabor’s flexible factors: “where both factors—formal title and
religious function—are present, the ministerial exception clearly applies.”199
The employee in Conlon brought a claim of gender discrimination, alleging she
was terminated for “failing to reconcile her marriage” when similarly situated
male employees who had divorced during employment were neither disciplined
nor terminated.200 The court held that both factors, title and function, weighed
in favor of applying the ministerial exception to this employee, the spiritual
director of an “evangelical campus mission.”201 The employee’s formal title was
either “spiritual director” or “Spiritual Formation Specialist”—both of which
contain wording that conveys a religious meaning.202 Functionally, the
194

Id. at *16.
Id. at *18.
196
Id. at *19.
197
Id. at *14–15.
198
Id. at *18–19. The court found that the employee’s job seemed to center solely on raising funds for the
organization and dealing with donors, duties that were also stated in his offer letter. Id. Further, his performance
reviews and evaluations centered only on fundraising success, workplace attitude, and efficiency. Id.
199
Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 853 (6th Cir. 2015).
200
Id. at 832.
201
Id. at 831, 835.
202
Id. at 834–35.
195
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employee’s duties included helping others cultivate “intimacy with God and
growth in Christ-like character through personal and corporate spiritual
disciplines.”203 As to the substance reflected in the employee’s title, the court
held that the employee’s certification in “spiritual direction”—with no further
information as to what that entailed, compared to Perich’s training in HosannaTabor—did not set the employee apart from lay employees.204 Thus, the factor
was not satisfied.205 Finally, the employee did not hold herself out as a minister
through her own use of the ministerial title because “nothing in the pleadings
suggest[ed] that [she] had the sort of public role of interacting with the
community as an ambassador to the faith that rises to the level of Perich’s
leadership role within her church, school, and community.”206 While the court
did not resolve the ambiguity as to whether function or title alone would suffice,
its approach in comparing the facts to those of Hosanna-Tabor—where all four
factors were satisfied—is well reasoned.207
4. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits: A Comparison
In the aftermath of Hosanna-Tabor, both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
were presented with cases involving teachers whose balance of religious and
secular duties were similar in scope.208 The circuits diverged, however, on their
outcomes, possibly based on minor factual differences, but perhaps also as a
result of a difference in analysis. This difference largely pares down to two
questions: (1) how much religious function is enough to favor application of the
ministerial exception; and (2) when a factor is satisfied to an extent that it
significantly weighs on the analysis.
In the 2018 Seventh Circuit case Grussgott v. Milwaukee,209 a teacher at a
private Jewish day school brought an ADA claim against the school, asserting
that she had been terminated because of cognitive issues she suffered as a result
of her brain tumor.210 The school moved for summary judgment on the grounds

203

Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 836.
209
Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2018).
210
Id. at 657. Grussgott ceased working during her recovery. After receiving treatment, she suffered from
memory and other cognitive issues. Id. Just under a year after returning to work, Grussgott was
“taunted . . . about her memory problems” by a parent during a phone call in which she was unable to remember
an event. Id. Subsequently, Grussgott’s husband sent an email from Grussgott’s work email address “criticizing
the parent for being disrespectful.” Id. Grussgott was terminated thereafter. Id.
204
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that the ministerial exception barred Grussgott’s lawsuit.211 Thus, the court
conducted the Hosanna-Tabor analysis,212 looking to the employee’s formal
title, the substance reflected in that title, the employee’s use of that title, and the
important religious functions she performed for the religious institution.213
However, the court expressly stated that the factors are examined “because they
provide a useful framework,” and that it is important to recognize that not all
four considerations are necessary in every case.214
First, the court concluded that Grussgott’s title indicated that her role was
not ministerial.215 She identified her role as “grade school teacher,”216 and even
if her title was “Hebrew teacher,” as that was the subject she taught, this title
would not alone prove a religious role.217 As to the second part of the analysis,
the court found that the substance reflected in Grussgott’s job title did weigh in
favor of applying the exception.218 “[T]eachers at the school were not required
to complete rigorous religious requirements comparable to [Perich] in HosannaTabor,” and, although Grussgott obtained the required Tal Am certification,219
the lack of description of what the certification required did not indicate any
strong religious substance in her role as a teacher.220 However, the Hebrew
teachers at the school were expected to incorporate religious teachings into their
lessons, per the unified Tal Am curriculum.221 Grussgott’s resume demonstrated
“significant religious teaching experience, which the former principal said was
a critical factor in the school hiring her.”222 Therefore, the court found that the
substance reflected in Grussgott’s title, both as conveyed to her by the school’s

211

Id.
Id. at 658. Outside of the Hosanna-Tabor analysis as to whether Grussgott was a minister, the court
also looked to whether the school was a religious institution. The court held that “the school’s nondiscrimination
policy [did] not constitute a waiver of the ministerial exception’s protections.” Id. A school may be an equalopportunity employer and need not exclude members of other faiths to be deemed a religious institution. Id.
213
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 192 (2012).
214
Grusgott, 882 F.3d at 658–59.
215
Id. at 659.
216
Id. The court notes how this title is distinct from Perich’s role as a “called teacher” and formal title of
“Minister of Religion, Commissioned” in Hosanna-Tabor. Id. (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 178, 191).
217
Grusgott, 882 F.3d at 659. The court’s reasoning stemmed from the fact that a teacher at a public school
with a purely secular job may have the same title (such as Hebrew teacher, Spanish teacher, or French teacher).
Id. The school argued that Hebrew is taught, in this context, as a religious exercise. Id. However, this argument
did not change the court’s finding as to title. Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. Tal Am is the integrated Hebrew and Jewish Studies curriculum from which Grussgott taught
Hebrew. Id. Grussgott could have obtained the required certification to teach this curriculum by completing
seminars in either the United States or Israel. Id.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
212
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requirement that she follow the Tal Am curriculum and as perceived by others
in hiring her based on past religious experience, “entail[ed] the teaching of the
Jewish religion to students” and supported the application of the ministerial
exception.223 However, the court found that Grussgott’s own use of her title, the
third factor, cut against applying the ministerial exception, after “examin[ing]
how [she] presented herself to the public.”224
As to the fourth factor of the analysis, the Seventh Circuit found that
Grussgott did perform “important religious functions” for the school, supporting
application of the ministerial exception.225 The discussion surrounding this
factor stemmed from the differing viewpoints of Grussgott and the school as to
the significance of the subject matter she taught.226 Grussgott argued that
teaching her students about prayer, the Torah, and Jewish holidays was a choice
of topic rather than a charge from the school.227 However, the court still
determined that “it [was] sufficient that the school clearly intended for her role
to be connected to the school’s Jewish mission,”228 countering her discretionary
planning argument.229 The school’s expectation that Grussgott followed the Tal
Am curriculum “combined with the importance of [her] Judaic teaching
experience in her being hired, confirm[ed] that the school expected her to play
an important role in ‘transmitting the [Jewish] faith to the next generation.’”230
Even if Grussgott did not know these were the school’s expectations of her, “the
purpose of the ministerial exception is to allow religious organizations the
freedom to hire or fire those who shape their faith,”231 and therefore it is the

223

Id. at 660.
Id. at 659. The court found that there was no evidence that Grussgott “held herself out to the community
as an ambassador of the Jewish faith, nor that she understood that her role would be perceived as a religious
leader.” Id. She consistently defined her role as a teacher of the “historical, cultural, and secular, rather than the
religious.” Id.
225
Id. at 660.
226
Id. It is undisputed that Grussgott taught her students about Jewish holidays, prayer, and the Torah, and
she practiced religion alongside her students. Id. She distinguished practicing and teaching prayer from leading
prayer, and distinguished teaching from a cultural perspective from a religious perspective. Id.
227
Id.
228
Id. The court compared the facts in Hosanna-Tabor, where the Court considered it important that Perich
was “expressly charged” with “lead[ing] others to Christian maturity,” with the school’s expectation here that
Grussgott follow its “expressly religious mission and to teach the Tal Am curriculum . . . designed to ‘develop
Jewish knowledge and identity in [its] learners.’” Id. at 660–61 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 192 (2012)); see Mission, HEBREW AND HERITAGE CURRICULA FOR
JEWISH SCHOOLS, http://www.talam.org/mission.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2020)).
229
Id. at 660.
230
Id. at 661 (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192). The court here also noted that, although Grussgott
claimed that any religious tasks she performed were voluntary, there was evidence she had occasionally been
given religious tasks, such as taking second grade students to study a Torah portion. Id.
231
Id.
224
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school’s expectations of religious teaching that matters.232 To avoid excessive
entanglement, the court “defer[red] to the organization in situations like this one,
where there is no sign of subterfuge.”233 Thus, the fourth factor weighed in favor
of the school.234
While the court in Grussgott concluded that at most two of the four
Hosanna-Tabor factors were present, the duties and functions of Grussgott’s
position outweighed the formalistic factors like her title and her own use of that
title.235 “Her job entailed many functions that simply would not be part of a
secular teacher’s job at a secular institution,”236 and, despite a few factual
disputes in the case, the court held that Grussgott’s own admissions about her
job were enough to establish coverage by the ministerial exception.237
In comparison with the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in two separate
cases, gave greater analytical weight to title and employees’ use of that title, but
only found that one of the four factors—function—favored ministerial status, as
opposed to the (at most) two factors found in Grusgott.238 The Ninth Circuit
demonstrated a wariness of uniform tests and a propensity to narrowly define a
minister in the pre-Hosanna-Tabor era.239 In the case of Biel v. St. James School,
the court held for Biel, a fifth grade teacher at St. James Catholic school who
brought a disability discrimination claim for violation of the ADA against her
employer.240 She brought this claim after she had informed her employer she
would have to miss work to undergo chemotherapy, and she was subsequently
terminated.241 The district court granted summary judgment for St. James on the
grounds that the ministerial exception barred Biel’s claim.242 Biel appealed to
the Ninth Circuit, which conducted the Hosanna-Tabor analysis to determine
232

Id.
Id. at 660. The court noted that this approach does not mean they may “never question a religious
organization’s designation of what constitutes religious activity.” Id. However, in situations where religious line
drawing, especially between “teaching religion” and “teaching about religion,” is extremely difficult and would
excessively entangle the government in religious affairs, deference is given to the organization. Id.; see Sch.
Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
234
Grusgott, 882 F.3d at 660.
235
Id. at 661.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
See id.; Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 2018); Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of
Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2019). These cases were later consolidated by the Supreme Court,
but for purposes of Part I.C.4, the lower court decisions are discussed to illustrate the development of circuit
splits.
239
Alcazar v. Corp. of the Cath. Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 2010).
240
Biel, 911 F.3d at 605.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 605, 607.
233
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whether Biel qualified as a minister under the exception.243 In doing so, the court
conducted a side-by-side analysis comparing the facts supporting each part of
the test in Hosanna-Tabor with those in Biel.244 The court also reiterated that
“the determination of who is a minister is a totality of the circumstances test [by
which the court must] consider ‘all the circumstances of [Biel’s] employment’
in the assessment of her role.”245
As to the first and second parts of the test, St. James did not hold Biel out as
a minister, nor did Biel’s title reflect ministerial substance or training.246 Biel’s
title was “Grade 5 Teacher,” which reflects no religious meaning.247 In contrast
to Perich, who could only be terminated by a supermajority vote of the
congregation, Biel’s employment was at-will and on a renewable contract.248
Biel “ha[d] none of Perich’s credentials, training, or ministerial background.”249
Biel received a liberal arts degree, and her position at St. James required no
religious background.250 The only training she received was a half-day
conference that taught attendees how to incorporate religious teachings into
daily lessons, along with techniques for teaching secular subjects, like art.251
Finally, the court noted that Biel’s past work for tutoring companies, public
schools, another Catholic school, and a Lutheran school indicated no
commitment to the religious aspects of a teaching role and was no indication that
she saw teaching ministry as a calling.252 The court also noted that nothing in
the record indicated that Biel considered or held herself out as a minister, as
“[s]he described herself as a teacher and claimed no benefits available only to
ministers.”253
The only indication of ministerial function, the court found, was with respect
to the fourth consideration: “whether the employee’s job duties included
‘important religious functions.’”254 Biel taught lessons on Catholicism for thirty

243

Id.
Id. at 608–09.
245
Id. at 619; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190
(2012) (“It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the
exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.”).
246
Id.
247
Id. at 608.
248
Id. at 608–09.
249
Id. at 608.
250
Id. at 605, 608.
251
Id. at 605.
252
Id. at 608.
253
Id. at 609.
254
Id. at 607 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 192
(2012)).
244
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minutes a day, four days a week.255 These lessons, however, came from a book
required by the school.256 She incorporated religious themes and symbols into
her classroom environment and curriculum, also required by the school.257 Biel’s
students led class prayers, and Biel joined them in prayer but did not teach, lead,
or plan them herself.258 These facts directly contrast with those surrounding
Perich, who planned the daily prayers for her students.259 Biel was also required
to accompany her students to monthly mass and to make sure they were wellbehaved, while Perich curated and led religious services for the school
throughout the year.260 The tasks St. James gave to Biel, the court held, “d[id]
not amount to the kind of close guidance and involvement that Perich had in her
students’ spiritual lives.”261
In keeping with the constitutional and policy considerations underlying the
decision in Hosanna-Tabor, the court in Biel found that, in viewing all
circumstances holistically, Biel was not a minister and therefore was not barred
by the ministerial exception from bringing a claim against St. James.262 Only
one of the four Hosanna-Tabor factors even had the potential to weigh in favor
of St. James, and one was not enough.263 The court reversed the district court’s
decision, stating that “we cannot read Hosanna-Tabor to exempt from federal
employment law all those who intermingle religious and secular duties but who
do not ‘preach [their employers’] beliefs, teach their faith, . . . carry out their
mission . . . [and] guide [their religious organization] on its way.”264
In Biel, the court mentioned an argument made by St. James that a contrary
conclusion should have been reached based on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Grussgott v. Milwaukee.265 The court responded that, “assuming Grussgott was
correctly decided, . . . the plaintiff in Grussgott more closely resembled Perich
than Biel.”266 Grussgott’s religious functions were slightly more significant than

255

Id. at 605.
Id. at 609.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192.
260
Id.; Biel, 911 F.3d at 609.
261
Biel, 911 F.3d at 609.
262
Id. at 610. Here, the Ninth Circuit seemingly continued the “reasonable construction” approach it had
in place prior to Hosanna-Tabor, looking at the factors under consideration holistically. Id.; Alcazar v. Corp. of
the Cath. Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 2010). As a result, it stayed consistent with
Hosanna-Tabor while not forcing itself to reach the same employer-favoring result. Biel, 911 F.3d at 611.
263
Biel, 911 F.3d at 610.
264
Id. at 611.
265
Id. at 609 (citing Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2018)).
266
Id.
256
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Biel’s, in part by virtue of the subjects she taught and their easy conflation with
administration of religion, along with her “significant religious teaching
experience.”267 Functional similarities between Perich, Grussgott, and Biel
existed in the requirement that they each taught religion at some point
throughout the day or week, but each teacher’s role diverged on how prevalent
religious teaching was to be.268 Of note is the question the Ninth Circuit posed
of whether Grussgott was decided correctly.269 This question became a subject
of debate among various circuits, scholars, and attorneys. Was Grussgott wrong
and Biel correct? Was Biel wrong and Grussgott correct? Were both correct
based on the flexibility of the Hosanna-Tabor analysis and thus a predicate for
the inconsistencies to come? Regardless, the Supreme Court would soon take a
stance, deeming the Biel decision incorrect.270
Shortly after Biel, the Ninth Circuit again had the opportunity to address the
ministerial exception in Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe School.271
While it found the same factor—function—to be the only one indicative of
ministerial status, the facts were significantly more indicative of ministerial
status, perhaps to an extent greater than in Grussgott.272 Morrissey-Berru, a
teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School, brought a claim against the school
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging she was moved from
a full-time contract to a part-time contract because of her age.273 After the lower
court held that Morrissey-Berru’s claim was barred by the ministerial exception,
the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the employee was not a minister for the
following reasons: her formal title was “Teacher,” she had no religious
credentials, training, or ministerial background outside of taking one course on
the history of the Catholic Church, she did not hold herself out to be a minister,
and her religious functions, though significant, were not on their own sufficient
to apply the exception.274 The “significant religious responsibilities” to which
the court referred were that “[Morrissey-Berru] was committed to incorporating
Catholic values and teachings into her curriculum, [she] led her students in daily
prayer, was in charge of liturgy planning for a monthly Mass, and directed and

267

Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 659.
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 204 (2012); Biel,
911 F.3d at 609; Grusgott, 882 F.3d at 656.
269
Biel, 911 F.3d at 609.
270
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020).
271
Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 460 (9th Cir. 2019).
272
Id. at 461.
273
Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 16-cv-09353-SVW-AFM, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
217504, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2017).
274
Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461.
268
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produced [an annual Easter performance].”275 These religious functions are
significantly greater than those in Biel, and by holding that Morrissey-Berru was
not a minister, the court limited application of the exception to a unique
extent.276
While it is not certain whether the individual plaintiffs in Grusgott, Biel, and
Morrissey-Berru would have fared differently had their jurisdictions been
swapped, the distinct modes of analysis employed in both circuits indicate that,
perhaps, they could have. Morrissey-Berru, in particular, would likely have
faced the opposite result if analyzed by the Grusgott Court. The inconsistencies
among circuits and intra-circuit debate between majority and dissenting opinions
stemmed from the flexibility of the Hosanna-Tabor four-factor analysis, and left
both employers and employees not knowing where they stand.277 However, the
Supreme Court has now made clear that the Ninth Circuit’s approach was wrong,
emphasizing the immense significance of religious function and frequent
insignificance of the other three factors.278
D. Morrissey-Berru: A Broad Reframing of Hosanna-Tabor
In 2020, the ministerial exception once again made its way to the Supreme
Court with the consolidated cases of Morrissey-Berru and Biel.279 Whereas the
factual backgrounds of these two cases have been discussed above, this
Comment now turns to the Court’s particular analysis of these facts.280 The
Supreme Court held that both Morrissey-Berru and Biel were ministers under
the exception, and that in holding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit “misunderstood”

275

Id.
Id.; see Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 2018). In Biel, the Ninth Circuit advocated
for a totality of the circumstances analysis as set forth by Hosanna-Tabor, which led them to hold that Biel was
not a minister. Id. In comparison to the teacher in Morrissey-Berru, Biel’s religious functions were minimal. In
its analysis in Morrissey-Berru, however, the Ninth Circuit seemed to conduct a different analysis, holding that
a teacher was not a minister when the facts, more so than in Biel, indicated she was. Though it purported to look
at the totality of the circumstances, the court seemingly looked at the totality of the four Hosanna-Tabor factors
and disregarded the fact that Morrissey-Berru’s functions may have been significant enough to tip the scale
toward ministerial status. Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 460. The court sought satisfaction of more than one
factor, rather than satisfaction that the totality of the circumstances, which may have pointed toward a finding
of ministerial status.
277
See Biel, 911 F.3d at 608 (“The dissent’s analysis of Biel’s title focuses on her duties at the school—
as opposed to her education, qualifications, and employment arrangement—and thus improperly collapses
considerations that the Supreme Court treated separately.”).
278
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2063 (2020).
279
Id. at 2056.
280
Id. at 2066. Significantly, the Court did not formally conduct the Hosanna-Tabor four-factor analysis
as lower courts had done. For example, it did not specifically address the third factor: how the employees held
themselves out. See id. at 2066–67.
276
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Hosanna-Tabor by treating its four factors as a checklist, thus distorting the
analysis.281 As to title, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit “invested undue
significance in the fact that Morrissey-Berru and Biel did not have clerical
titles.”282 Instead, the Court noted that the fact that they were Catholic school
teachers meant they were their students’ primary religious teachers, and that this
“concept of a teacher of religion [was] loaded with religious significance.”283
Next, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit gave “too much weight to the
fact that Morrissey-Berru and Biel had less formal religious schooling than
Perich.”284 It stated that the significance of formal training will often depend on
the level of schooling—for example, whether the position was at an elementary
school versus a divinity school—as well as the school’s judgment regarding
whether such training is necessary.285 Here, because the schools thought
Morrissey-Berru and Biel had sufficient understanding of Catholicism to teach
their students, the Court held that it was in no position to question the schools’
judgments.286
Third, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit “inappropriately diminished the
significance of Biel’s duties” by emphasizing that “[she] merely taught ‘religion
from a book required by the school,’ ‘joined’ students in prayer, and
accompanied students to Mass in order to keep them ‘quiet and in their seats.’”287
The Court held that this analysis misrepresented the record and its significance,
that many teachers teach closely to textbooks, and that “many faith traditions
prioritize teaching from authoritative texts.”288 Biel “prayed with her students,
taught them prayers, supervised the prayers led by students, prepared them for
Mass, accompanied them to Mass, and prayed with them there.”289 Regarding
Morrissey-Berru, the Court held that her assertion that she was not a practicing
Catholic did not disqualify her under the exception, and, further, that requiring
courts to more deeply explore what being a practicing Catholic meant would
“put [religious employers] in an impossible position.”290 Beyond this analysis,
the Court did not delve deeper into Morrissey-Berru’s functions, likely because

281

Id.
Id. at 2067.
283
Id. The Court supports this idea with the fact that the term “rabbi” means “teacher” and that Jesus was
often referred to as “rabbi.” Id.
284
Id.
285
Id. at 2067–68.
286
Id. at 2068.
287
Id. (citing Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 2018)).
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id. at 2069.
282
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the lower court seemed to indicate that her religious functions would have
qualified her under the exception, had the other factors been satisfied.291 The
Court held that neither title nor the academic requirements of a positions are
always important, and that “what matters, at bottom, is what an employee does,”
effectively adopting Justice Alito’s concurrence from Hosanna-Tabor.292 “[I]t is
sufficient,” the Court held, “to decide the cases before us” without adopting a
rigid formula.293
Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Morrissey-Berru argues that the majority’s
decision was a “step in the right direction,” but further emphasizes the
importance of deferring to religious groups’ “good-faith understandings of
which individuals are charged with carrying out the organizations’ religious
missions.”294 Such deference will allow courts to avoid governmental
interference into the right of a religious group “to shape its own faith and mission
through its appointments.”295 The concurrence looked to the record in this case,
including faculty handbooks and teaching contracts, stating that it “confirms the
sincerity of petitioners’ claims” that Biel and Morrissey-Berru held ministerial
roles, despite being lay teachers.296
Finally, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent—which Justice Ginsberg joined—
argued that the majority, “in foreclosing the teachers’ claims . . . skew[ed] the
facts, ignore[d] the applicable standard of review, and collapse[d] HosannaTabor’s careful analysis into a single consideration: whether a church thinks its
employees play an important religious role.”297 While the majority—and to a
greater extent, the concurrence—emphasized the importance of deference to the
religious institution and a broad exception to achieve that deference, the dissent
emphasized the importance of a narrow exception to account for the exception’s
“stark departure from antidiscrimination law” and “potential for abuse.”298 The
dissent argued that under the true Hosanna-Tabor approach and common sense,
the teachers in this case were not ministers, especially because the employers
291
See Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019)
(“Morrissey-Berru did have significant religious responsibilities . . . . However, an employee’s duties alone are
not dispositive under Hosanna-Tabor’s framework.”).
292
Morrisey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2064; see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171, 200 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
293
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2069. The Court noted that lower courts had been applying the
ministerial exception for years “without such a formula.” Id. The Court was correct, despite that application
being short of consistent.
294
Id. at 2070–71 (Thomas, J., concurring).
295
Id. at 2071 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173).
296
Id.
297
Id. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
298
Id. at 2072–73.
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sought summary judgment and thus the facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the employees.299
In conducting its own analysis, the dissent noted that, in addition to language
about the religious mission of the schools, the employment contracts also
referred to Biel and Morrissey-Berru as “teacher” and directed them to the
benefits guides for “Lay Employees.”300 This “lay teacher” status, the dissent
stated, has been long recognized as a “mark” of non-ministerial status.301
Further, the dissent deemed irrelevant the majority’s argument that “attaching
too much significance to titles would risk privileging religious traditions with
formal organizational structures over those that are less formal.”302 It did so
because the cases at hand were not about such “less formal” religions but rather
about the Catholic Church, which has a “publicized and undisputedly ‘formal
organizational structure.’”303 The dissent then noted, as to the third factor of the
Hosanna-Tabor analysis, that neither teacher had significant degrees of religious
training and that neither teacher held herself out as a leader in the faith
community.304 It also criticized the majority for failing to “grapple with this third
component of the Hosanna-Tabor inquiry” at all.305 Lastly, the dissent looked
to Biel and Morrissey-Berru’s functions, noting that the amount of time they
spent on secular subjects surpassed their time teaching religion, and that their
more specific religious roles were not sufficient to make them ministers.306 The
dissent argued that, if teaching religion alone dictated ministerial status, then
Hosanna-Tabor “wasted precious pages discussing titles, training, and other
objective indicia.”307 Warning of the repercussions this result posed, the dissent
cautioned that the majority’s conclusion puts not only secular teachers in
religious schools at risk, but also subjects “coaches, camp counselors, nurses,
social-service workers, in-house lawyers . . . and many others who work for
religious institutions” to discrimination for reasons unrelated to religion.308

299

Id. at 2076.
Id. at 2077.
301
Id. at 2079.
302
Id. at 2064, 2079.
303
Id.
304
Id. at 2080. The dissent noted that the employees did not claim any benefits available only to spiritual
leaders and did not hold themselves out as anything other than a fifth-grade teacher. Id.
305
Id.
306
Id.
307
Id. at 2081.
308
Id. at 2082 (“Little if nothing appears left of the statutory exemptions after today’s constitutional
broadside. So long as the employer determines that an employee’s ‘duties’ are ‘vital’ to ‘carrying out the mission
of the church,’ then today’s laissez faire analysis appears to allow that employer to make employment decisions
[for discriminatory reasons] having nothing to do with religion.”).
300
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While Morrissey-Berru did provide a reframed Hosanna-Tabor analysis
focused on function and deference to the religious institution, the dissent may
be correct in fearing that the Court opened the exception up for greater abuse,
thus posing a new challenge for lower courts apart from inconsistency. The
better solution still may have been to clarify Hosanna-Tabor in a way that
encourages courts to look to the purpose of the exception through each factor.
Part II briefly addresses the solutions that have already been adopted by courts
or proposed by scholars in response to Hosanna-Tabor’s ambiguities.
II. APPROACHES PROPOSED IN THE POST-HOSANNA-TABOR ERA
Hosanna-Tabor left lower courts with great discretion in the analysis it
provided. Most courts have construed the test broadly and have made a finding
of ministerial status where religious function is present. The Ninth Circuit took
a narrower approach and, while the result in Biel may seem attractive in light of
discrimination policy concerns, the result likely would have been different in
another circuit. Section A addresses the solutions that have been adopted and
proposed—by courts and scholars alike—regarding the appropriate balance of
function and title. It further discusses the approaches that have been put into
practice by courts,309 but which are either inadequate or have departed too far
from precedent to garner circuit-wide application. Section B then summarizes
an approach that calls for a clear bifurcation of the employee’s secular and
religious functions.
A. Function Versus Title
Different circuits have formulated different adaptations of Hosanna-Tabor
that turn upon the balance of function and title.310 These adaptations include the
Second Circuit’s “sliding-scale,”311 the Second Circuit’s substance- and

309

See supra Part I.C.
Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., 18-CV-0592(ALC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *14–15 (2d
Cir. Mar. 29, 2019); Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F. Supp. 3d 177, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Grussgott v.
Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Cannata v. Cath. Diocese of Austin,
700 F.3d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 2012)); Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 202 (2d Cir.
2017).
311
Aparicio, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *14–15; Penn, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 182.
310
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function-over-title approach,312 and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ slightly
varied function and title balancing approach.313
The sliding-scale approach illustrated by Penn v. New York Methodist
Hospital argued that, where an employee’s role is extensively religious, that
employee can be deemed a minister even if the employer institution is almost
fully secular.314 Such a sliding-scale brings up an issue of line-drawing that may
be so difficult that it renders the approach both unmanageable and an affront to
antidiscrimination laws. Though the employee in Penn was arguably a minister
in the most fundamental sense, the employer had affirmatively become nonsectarian.315 Therefore, Penn represented a case of the ministerial exception
being offered to a non-religious employer—a far jump from the exemption’s
core purpose under Title VII and the Constitution.316 Further, it is unclear how
the sliding-scale approach would function practically in the opposite direction,
as it could encourage a finding of ministerial status for a highly secular employee
in the context of a clearly religious organization. Such a result may allow courts
to extend the exception to any employee who conducts a minor religious task or
shares a minor religious characteristic akin to the secular hospital’s mission
statement.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Fratello illustrates a function-over-title
approach reminiscent of the primary duties test.317 The Fratello approach first
gave a great deal of deference to lower courts in allowing them to apply all,
some, or none of the four Hosanna-Tabor factors.318 While it went through the
four-factor analysis and concluded, perhaps correctly based on the facts, that the
employee was a minister, its immediate posture was that function is key, and the
other factors are mere recommendations.319 Taking a similar function-over-title
approach, the Seventh Circuit in Grussgott held that satisfaction of two factors—
the employee’s function, and the substance reflected by the employee’s title—
was consistent with Hosanna-Tabor and sufficient to find the employee was a

312
Fratello, 863 F.3d at 202. This approach mirrors Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor, and
his statement that the lower courts should keep an eye toward function in making their determination of who is
or is not a minister for purposes of the exception. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171, 203 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). The employee’s label served merely as shorthand for the more
important function and substance reflected therein. Id. at 202–03.
313
Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 661.
314
Penn, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 182.
315
Id. at 182–83.
316
U.S. CONST. amend. I; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
317
Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205, 209; see supra Part I.C.
318
Fratello, 863 F.3d at 204–05.
319
Id. at 205–06.
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minister under the exception.320 Though the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that
not all four factors must be present in every case, it considered them a framework
under which each factor should be considered.321 Ultimately affirming a most
extreme function-over-title approach, the Supreme Court held in MorrisseyBerru that “what matters, at bottom, is what an employee does,” that function
alone is sufficient, and that circumstances relating to title may have far less
significance in some cases.322
The idea of functional separation is also reflected in a more radical
proposition: limiting the exception to instances of religious motivation.323 A
religious motivation limitation effectively calls for a return to the plain language
of section 702 of Title VII, which explicitly exempts religious organizations only
from the prohibition on employment discrimination for religious purposes, with
no specification as to any other discriminatory purpose.324 Commentators like
Katherine Hinkle and Benton Martin have called for this approach.325 This
approach asks courts to look only to whether the employment decision “was
motivated by a sincerely held religious belief.”326 The religious employer would

320

Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 660–61 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 658–59; cf. Fratello, 863 F.3d at 204–05 (interpreting Hosanna-Tabor to be an instruction “only
as to what [courts] might take into account as relevant, including the four considerations on which it
relied . . . [but which neither] limits the inquiry to those considerations nor requires their application in every
case”).
322
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2063–64 (2020). The Ninth Circuit
in Morrissey-Berru, in contrast, reasoned that religious function alone, even if significant, is not enough for a
court to conclude an employee is a minister. Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x. at 461. It took this idea from Biel,
but perhaps did so incorrectly, as the religious duties of the employee in Biel were significantly less than those
in Morrissey-Berru. Id.; Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 608 (9th Cir. 2018). It is not clear whether Biel
required more than one of the four factors to be satisfied or whether function alone did not suffice based on the
minimal religious duties. Id. at 610. However, the Ninth Circuit’s Morrissey-Berru interpretation did not employ
a reasonable construction of the exception. Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461; see supra text accompanying
note 76.
323
Hinkle, supra note 76, at 338.
324
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (indicating that the prohibition on employers with more than fifteen employees
from religious discrimination does not apply to “any religious corporation, association, educational institution,
or society” that hires individuals of the associated religion to perform work connected with the activities of that
religion).
325
Hinkle, supra note 76, at 338; Benton Martin, Comment, Protecting Preachers from Prejudice:
Methods for Improving Analysis of the Ministerial Exception to Title VII, 59 EMORY L.J. 1297, 1334 (2010).
Notably, Martin’s comment was written prior to Hosanna-Tabor; however, Hinkle’s reiteration of the idea in
the post-Hosanna-Tabor era indicates that it is still a proposition that many consider.
326
Hinkle, supra note 76, at 340; see also Martin, supra note 325, at 1334–35 (“[A] new paragraph should
be added . . . that shifts to religious organizations the burden of producing a religious justification for their
alleged employment discrimination. . . . If no such religious justification is produced, the court can proceed in
evaluating the minister’s claim. . . . If a religious justification is produced, the court’s inquiry will be limited to
determining whether the evidence proves that the religious justification is merely pretext.”).
321
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carry the burden of providing this religious justification,327 and the court, if
satisfied with the justification, would then be barred from hearing the case
further.328 If the court is not satisfied with the religious justification, it should
proceed in evaluating the claim.329 However, since the McClure case in 1972,
which affirmed that the ministerial exception applied in cases of gender
discrimination, the exception’s application to all varieties of discrimination has
been continually reiterated.330 In 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed that the
exception and its wide scope were rooted in the Constitution,331 and now that the
Supreme Court has once again affirmed an even broader exception,332 it is
unlikely the Court would return to a religious motivation limitation as proposed
in both Hinkle and Martin’s scholarship.333
B. Bifurcation of Secular and Religious Duties
Two common questions pervade each case in which an employee has both
religious and secular duties: first, how are these distinct duties balanced; and
second, at what point does one so outweigh the other so as to strike the balance
in its favor? The courts have acknowledged that the existence of secular duties
among a slew of religious duties does not detract from the religiosity of an
employee’s position nor his or her ministerial status.334 However, commentators
have voiced a concern for fairness regarding cases in which an employee, whose
role is largely secular, is deemed a “minister” based on the relatively minor
religious roles that the employee undertakes.335 These commentators have called
for, instead, a bifurcation or “disaggregat[ion]” of the religious and secular roles
of employees.336

327
Martin, supra note 325, at 1334–35. Martin argues that this approach could be solidified with an
amendment to Title VII explicitly shifting the burden of proving a religious justification to the employer. Id. at
1334.
328
Hinkle, supra note 76, at 340–41. Hinkle is unclear regarding whether a court should proceed with the
Hosanna-Tabor analysis or a Hosanna-Tabor-type analysis after it has concluded that a religious motivation
exists, or whether existence of a good faith religious motivation is enough to bar the case completely. Id.
329
Id. at 340. Hinkle is again unclear as to whether, if no religious motivation exists, a court should hear
the claim as it would any other employment discrimination case, or whether a Hosanna-Tabor analysis should
be conducted. Id. at 340–41.
330
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972).
331
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189–90, 194–95 (2012).
332
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020).
333
See Hinkle, supra note 76, at 338; Martin, supra note 325, at 1334.
334
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 193.
335
See, e.g., Jed Glickstein, Note, Should the Ministerial Exception Apply to Functions, Not Persons?,
122 YALE L.J. 1964, 1977 (2013).
336
Id. at 1975; Interview with Michael J. Broyde, Professor of Law, Emory Univ. Sch. of L. (Oct. 7, 2019)
(on file with author).
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The basic idea behind this approach is that “the same employee can function
ministerially at one moment, but nonministerially the next,” and that an
employee who serves a blend of both functions should be able to claim damages
on the portion of their position that was not ministerial.337 Jed Glickstein best
illustrates the reason for this approach, which he calls a “blended approach,”
through a hypothetical involving two employees, Jane and John, a brother and
sister who both work as janitors for a church.338 The only difference between the
siblings is that six months into her tenure, Jane is asked to work as a part-time
organist for the church in addition to her role as a janitor.339 The following
hypothetical illustrates this approach:
[A]s organist, Jane regularly performs at church services under the
supervision of the local pastor, but for the other twenty hours she
continues to perform the same duties as her brother. Six more months
pass, until the church suddenly fires both John and Jane on the same
day and in an identical manner. Based on some overheard comments
and circumstantial evidence, the siblings come to believe they were
both fired on account of their race. After filing the appropriate notices
with the EEOC, they sue.340

Glickstein argues that, under existing law, a court would likely find Jane to be a
minister covered by the exception and thus barred from bringing her claim, while
John could likely proceed with his.341 This disparity is what the blended or
bifurcated approach seeks to address.342 At its core, the approach critiques the
idea that if one is a minister at all, then one is a minister always.343 It requires us
to look at an employee’s position—which may consist of multiple roles and
duties, both ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical—and examine what portion of
the employee’s job can be characterized as secular for purposes of bringing
suit.344
The difficulty of bifurcating the roles of an employee under this approach
would vary based on the legal claim and remedies sought.345 For example, in the
case of an employee seeking purely monetary damages, the court would have to

337

Glickstein, supra note 335, at 1974–75.
Id. at 1972, 1974.
339
Id. at 1972.
340
Id.
341
Id. Glickstein states that such an outcome, where “two people who are, in important ways, similarly
situated and similarly harmed” receive disparate treatment, is deeply unintuitive. Id.
342
Id. at 1973–74.
343
Id. at 1974.
344
Id. at 1974–75.
345
Id. at 1975.
338
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determine what portion of the employee’s salary was earned from his or her
secular role, and the church would face liability to the employee only for that
portion of his or her role.346 Reinstatement would be a more complex issue, as it
more deeply roots the government in the hiring decisions of the religious
institution—contrary to the purpose of the exception.347
While this blended approach, in its rejection of all factors outside of
function, somewhat aligns with the Supreme Court’s analysis in MorrisseyBerru, it does not account for instances where those first three factors—whether
the religious institution held the employee out as a minister, whether the
employee’s title reflected a certain degree of religious training, and whether the
employee used the title and held herself out to be a minister—may be
informative.348 Even under the function-focused precedent of Morrissey-Berru,
to completely ignore all these indicia of ministerial status and focus purely on
the day-to-day duties of an employee for remedy calculation may too severely
simplify the ministerial exception and its purpose, especially in cases where the
formal factors play a key role.349 Further, the approach diverges from MorrisseyBerru and Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor in that it would
diminish “the constitutional protection of religious teachers . . . when they take
on secular functions in addition to their religious ones.”350
III. CREATING A MORE CONSISTENT LANDSCAPE AND AVOIDING ABUSE:
CLARIFYING AND NARROWING THE HOSANNA-TABOR FRAMEWORK
The ministerial exception implicates two key areas of American
jurisprudence: religious freedom and employment discrimination. For this
reason, it is clear why creating the fairest and clearest mode of analysis is no
simple task. What has also become clear, however, is that the Hosanna-Tabor
test does not address some of the significant concerns surrounding the

346

Id.
Id. at 1975–76. Returning to the hypothetical situation of the part-time organist and janitor, Glickstein
notes that, if Jane were to be reinstated to her janitor role and not her organist role, it would pose two issues. Id.
at 1976. First, it would run contrary to the usual mode of employment decisions, which are made at the individual
employee level and not individual function level. Id. Second, it may economically burden the church if the reason
it employed Jane part-time in each role is because it could not afford to employ full-time employees for each, or
even because it did not want to. Id. Reinstatement thus poses too much risk of infringement by the government
and runs too contrary to the goals of the exception and the First Amendment more generally, to ever likely be
accepted. Id.
348
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2066–67 (2020).
349
Glickstein, supra note 335, at 1978–79.
350
Id. at 1981 (“Admittedly, no court has yet suggested a blended approach to the ministerial exception,
and those that have skirted the edges do not seem positively inclined.”).
347
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ministerial exception and that Morrissey-Berru may have exacerbated the need
for addressing those concerns. Part III proposes a solution to Hosanna-Tabor’s
ambiguities by drawing upon pre-Hosanna-Tabor cases, Hosanna-Tabor itself,
and subsequent cases, including Morrissey-Berru. This Part first addresses the
foundations upon which the proposal is based. Section A then clarifies how
function and title should be balanced, while section B explains how religious
importance should be analyzed in the context of case-specific facts.
A tendency toward favoring the religious employer has become evident in
post-Hosanna-Tabor case law, and while courts have reasoned their way to this
more common result, an air of result-chasing still lingers.351 This result-driven
analysis is clear in the majority’s framing of the facts in Morrissey-Berru.352
Even if courts are not motivated by result, the extension of the ministerial
exception in most circuits since 2012 has been very broad, resulting in holdings
that mirror the Court’s in Hosanna-Tabor.353 While this broad application is
consistent with Hosanna-Tabor, based on Hosanna-Tabor’s sheer scope and
deference to lower courts, reasoning among courts and among circuits has varied
widely but has suspiciously resulted in identical outcomes for unique cases.354
Perhaps dangerously, Morrissey-Berru confirmed and singled out the functionfocused analysis these lower courts had put into practice.355
Hosanna-Tabor, in comparison with later circuit cases involving teachers,
presented a fairly clear case of a minister.356 Perich had a ministerial title, the
school held her out to be a minister and required significant religious training
for her position, she claimed a special ministerial housing allowance on her
taxes, and she served significant religious functions.357 She met all four factors,
so the Court did not need to specify how each should be weighed.358 Given this
lack of guidance and the fairly straightforward case surrounding Perich, lower
courts should not have felt as confident as they did in applying Hosanna-Tabor
351
See, e.g., Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2018); Fratello v.
Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 202 (2d Cir. 2017); Cannata v. Cath. Diocese of Austin, 700
F.3d 169, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2012).
352
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2077–78, 2080 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority
asserted facts without citation and relied on disputed factual assertions in defiance of the summary judgment
standard, which resulted in a holding favorable to the religious employer).
353
See Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 660–61; Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205–06; Cannata, 700 F.3d at 179–80.
354
See Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 660–61; Fratello, 863 F.3d at 205–06; Cannata, 700 F.3d at 179–80. This
is not true of all courts, as the Ninth Circuit demonstrated by its employee-favoring holding in Biel. Biel v. St.
James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2018).
355
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2064.
356
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 191–92 (2012).
357
Id.
358
See id. at 190–92.
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in later cases of less clarity. The proposed new framework more specifically
addresses how function and title should be balanced and how the religious
importance of an employee should be analyzed based upon which facts, if
introduced, carry the most weight in affirming or refuting ministerial status.
Deriving from a similar concern about result-driven analyses, in 1959,
Herbert Wechsler introduced his concept of “neutral principles.”359 Wechsler
had become concerned about what seemed to him “an understandable judicial
desire to produce specific results, principally in the area of race, [that] had begun
to produce decisions [he] could not relate to a defensible rationale of
interpretation or development.”360 Judges, he observed, were result-driven rather
than process-driven—a troubling pattern in the wake of important race-related
cases that deserved consistency in the judicial process.361 The neutral principles
idea, he described, was not to be thought of as “a formula to guide or produce
the decision of hard cases.”362 Rather, it was a “negative test . . . to be applied
by a judge” in which that judge must consider “whether he is being adequately
consistent in the process of adjudication, in reaching a particular type of result
in a particular type of case.”363
Thus, the proposed approach for ministerial exception cases shares a similar
goal to Wechsler’s neutral principals: to urge consistency in judicial reasoning
based on what makes sense, rather than based on achieving certain results.364
This proposed approach seeks to achieve that goal, however, by more clearly
defining the Hosanna-Tabor analysis based on prior case law, objective
standards, and elements of contract law, rather than based fully on an existing
body of secular law. The following approach also balances deference to religious
organizations with judicial reasoning designed to objectively analyze and avoid
unconstitutional interference.365

359
Norman I. Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward “Neutral Principles” in the Law: Selections from the
Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 924–25 (1993) (citing Herbert Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, n.† (1959)).
360
Id. at 924.
361
Id.
362
Id. at 925.
363
Id. In other words, Wechsler says that a judge must ask himself or herself, “Would I reach the same
result if the substantive interests were otherwise?” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
364
Id. at 924–25.
365
Id. This approach seeks to strike a balance similar to that in church property disputes: a civil court does
not violate the First Amendment if it applies neutral principles of law to cases involving religious organizations,
and if it defers to the church court for the resolution of religious doctrine. WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at
235. Here, the neutral principles idea will be replaced by a set of standards derived from case law with an eye
toward fairness, careful balancing, and avoiding any unconstitutional interference.
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Further, the proposed framework seeks to avoid the slippery slope of an
expanding ministerial exception. From the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Title VII through the present, the ministerial exception, at its core, has
protected religious discrimination by religious institutions against the most
obvious ministers of those religious institutions—the clergy.366 What has
evolved over time is the judicial interpretation of the constitutional exception
and the expansion of what and who is covered in its penumbra. Since McClure,
and as affirmed in Hosanna-Tabor, courts have applied the exception to cases
involving all forms of discrimination367 and to employees in a variety of roles—
from priest to choral leader to called teacher to lay principal to lay teacher.368
The open-endedness of the Hosanna-Tabor factors, combined with the
pressure to favor the employer, raises the question of how far the exception may
be extended over time, a question Morrissey-Berru answered, in a way. Lay
teachers tasked with relatively minor religious duties, when compared with their
secular duties, seem to be one of the grayer areas that courts, over the past eight
years, have been navigating.369 This gray area risks preventing employees from
knowing their rights in relation to their religious employers. However, based on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrissey-Berru, it seems that courts may be
able, and may even be encouraged, to reason their way to ministerial status in
cases involving any employee—so long as that employee in some way furthers
the mission of the religious institution.370 This result would stray too far from
the core purpose of the exception.371 While the following proposal does not aim
to limit the exception to its core subjects—religious discrimination and obvious
366
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2071–72 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that there are obvious and “commonsense” examples of ministers like a member of the
Christian clergy or a rabbi).
367
See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 179, 190 (2012)
(disability discrimination); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972) (gender
discrimination). While the ministerial exception has been applied to all forms of discrimination, it will not be
applied in sex discrimination cases involving sexual harassment. See infra note 426.
368
See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 178, 190 (involving a kindergarten and fourth grade teacher at an
Evangelical Lutheran school); Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655,659, 662 (7th Cir.
2018) (involving a grade school teacher at a private Jewish day school); Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese
of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 206 (2d Cir. 2017) (involving the principal of a Roman Catholic School); Cannata v.
Cath. Diocese of Austin, 700 F.3d 169, 176–77 (5th Cir. 2012) (involving the music director of a Catholic
church).
369
Compare Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 609–10 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565
U.S. at 196), with Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 660–62 (demonstrating the varied consideration and weight courts give
to each circumstance of a teacher’s functions when those functions are both secular and religious).
370
See, e.g., McClure, 460 F.2d at 559–60.
371
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194–95 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)) (noting that the exception ensures “that the authority to select and
control who will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical’—is the church’s alone”).
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ministers—it does aim to contain Hosanna-Tabor reasonably and with a concern
for rights outside of just freedom of religion. It attempts to refine the HosannaTabor analysis to achieve more equitable results among circuits and avoid an
application of the test so broad that the fundamental right to religious autonomy
absolutely trumps other fundamental and statutory rights.
An overarching question pervades each ministerial exception case: is the
employee’s role important enough to the religious organization’s mission of
transmitting the faith that interfering with the hiring or firing of that employee
would unconstitutionally infringe on the religious organization’s free-exercise
right?372 Most people have a general idea of what “transmitting the faith” may
entail,373 and thus, upon hearing the facts of ministerial exception cases, would
have an “immediate reaction[]” as to whether the employee-plaintiff plays an
important role in fulfilling that mission.374 While the broadness of HosannaTabor has led to inconsistent and sometimes unintuitive interpretations, it also
encourages an approach that looks at all circumstances objectively and
reasonably and that balances those circumstances in a holistic manner.375 This
new framework addresses, first, how to balance function and title, and second,
how the religious importance of an employee should be analyzed considering
the facts introduced.
A. Balancing Function and Title
Function is the most important of the four Hosanna-Tabor factors, as argued
by Justice Alito in Hosanna-Tabor,376 many of the lower courts,377 and the
Supreme Court in Morrissey-Berru.378 However, Hosanna-Tabor expressly
refused to adopt a “rigid formula,” indicate the weight of each factor in relation
to one another, and indicate how many factors, if satisfied, were determinative
of ministerial status.379 In the case of Perich in Hosanna-Tabor, the
circumstances of both her title and function sufficed to prove she was a minister,

372

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89.
Id. at 192.
374
Silber & Miller, supra note 359, at 925.
375
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190–92. This holistic analysis is unlike the analysis proffered later by the
Supreme Court in Morrissey-Berru, which the dissent argued was unnecessarily broad in its deference to the
religious employer and dismissive of any factor other than function. See 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2071–72 (2020)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
376
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S at 200 (Alito, J., concurring).
377
Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2018); Fratello v. Roman
Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 202 (2d Cir. 2017).
378
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2064, 2066, 2069.
379
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
373
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and that conclusion is all the Court left to lower courts as guidance.380 Therefore,
lower courts took liberties in creating distinct modes of analyses, often focusing
solely on function.381
Morrissey-Berru took this a step further, deeming the Hosanna-Tabor
factors outside the scope of function flexible to the point of insignificance,
stating that “our recognition of the significance of those factors in Perich’s case
did not mean that they must be met—or even that they are necessarily
important—in all other cases.”382 This jump from a “non-rigid formula” to
effectively making Hosanna-Tabor’s entire discussion of non-function factors a
waste of “precious pages” cannot be right, especially when the reason for a
balanced test is to provide some limit to the exception.383
Contrary to these lower court interpretations and to the Supreme Court’s new
stance, courts cannot choose to focus solely on function when more is at play
and cannot simply ignore the fact that every one of the four factors in HosannaTabor was satisfied when the Court held Perich was a minister.384 The other
three factors can be indicative, though not determinative, of ministerial status,
and the desire to defer to the religious employer should not make courts blind to
the employee.385 Function is most often key, and when function is so significant
as to clearly meet the purpose of the exception, it can, and perhaps should,
outweigh the lack of the other three more formal considerations.386 Exceedingly
religious function should not just be ignored as it was in the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis of Morrissey-Berru.387 There, the Supreme Court fairly concluded that
the employee was a minister under Hosanna-Tabor based on the very strong
functional indicators that she was transmitting the faith.388
Similarly, however, courts should not be reluctant to acknowledge when
there is a lesser showing of religious function,389 instead of simply “trading legal
analysis for a rubber stamp” of automatic ministerial status.390 A holistic analysis

380

Id. at 190–92.
See Fratello, 863 F.3d at 202.
382
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2063.
383
Id. at 2081 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
384
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192.
385
Id. at 202 (Alito, J., concurring).
386
Id. at 198–99.
387
Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019).
388
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2066–69.
389
See id. The Court, for example, basically equated the weight of function-related facts in Biel to those
in Morrissey-Berru, when in reality the facts in Biel were quite less indicative of ministerial status.
390
Id. at 2076 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
381

BARRICK_12.2.20

2020]

12/3/2020 1:17 PM

THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION

513

should still be employed.391 Even in Aparicio, where the Southern District of
New York held the employee was not a minister, the court was extremely
hesitant to come to a conclusion as to any of the four Hosanna-Tabor factors
aside from function.392 When one of the four factors pointed largely toward not
granting ministerial status, the smallest religious aspects pressed the court to
disregard the factor entirely.393 By allotting a certain weight to each factor and
to the circumstances within each factor, courts may feel more comfortable
acknowledging factors outside of function, and if those factors are not strong
indicators, they may receive less weight.
Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, and arguably even in Biel, the Ninth Circuit
adopted a reasonable construction as a guiding force in the context of the
ministerial exception.394 This idea supports a reasonable balancing of the factors,
depending on the circumstances supporting their application in each case. If, for
example, factor three (whether the employee held herself out to be a minister or
perceived herself that way), demonstrated a strong leaning against ministerial
status, and title weighed only slightly more toward ministerial status than not,
this would weigh against applying the exception. The Sixth Circuit’s analysis in
Conlon employed a seemingly reasonable approach as well, serving as a model
for the “reasonableness” aspect of the proposed analysis here.395 It held that two
factors, title and function, weighed in favor of applying the ministerial
exception.396 As to the other two factors—the substance reflected in the title and
the employee’s use of the title—the evidence was either insufficient or
unconvincing in relation to Hosanna-Tabor.397 In that case, it was a reasonable
approach to understand religious title and religious function, if individually
satisfied, to be sufficient when combined.398 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Morrissey-Berru illustrates a failure to apply a reasonable
construction.399 Conceptualizing the analysis as a point system, the court
basically allotted a single point per factor satisfied, when a better approach
would have been to allot a few points to a factor if it was significantly satisfied,
391
Aparicio v. Christian Union, Inc., No. 18-CV-0592, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55938, at *14–15 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019).
392
Id. at *14–19.
393
See id.
394
Alcazar v. Corp. of the Cath. Archbishop of Seattle, 627 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (9th Cir. 2010). While
the idea of a “reasonable construction” does not give a clear test, it does provide a more overarching idea of
balance—which may be key to this kind of big implication analysis.
395
Conlon v. Intervarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 777 F.3d 829, 834–835 (6th Cir. 2015).
396
Id. at 835.
397
Id.
398
Id.
399
Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019).
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and a single point if it was only slightly or vaguely satisfied.400 Further, the court
failed to acknowledge that function does merit greater weight than the other
three factors individually.401
One of the main issues that has surrounded the four Hosanna-Tabor factors
is not the factors themselves, but rather the lower court decisions, and now
Supreme Court decision, to view individual factors as optional. Therefore, the
four factors should remain in place but with a clearer instruction on how they
should be balanced. Religious function should always be present for an
employee to be considered a minister, in turn making it a requirement. Without
any practical religious function, any intended religious importance becomes
moot. Further, function alone may suffice to prove ministerial status if that
function indicates a predominantly ministerial and functionally essential
employee. Characterizing what types of functions and attributes indicate an
employee “whose functions are essential to the independence of practically all
religious groups” will also help guide the analysis more consistently.402
The other three factors—the employee’s title, the substance reflected in that
title, and the employee’s own perception of his or her role—must be considered
and may be probative of ministerial status or a lack thereof, as held in HosannaTabor.403 Minimal religious function may be significantly supplemented by a
title that reflects religious importance, the employer’s expectation that the
employee transmit the faith, or an employee’s own use of their status as a
minister. Minimal religious function, without any of the aforementioned formal
factors, should not alone suffice. While a court may find, after analysis of these
three factors, that they are not indicative of ministerial status, a court cannot
simply choose to ignore all three.404 Title means little without any function to
support it, as does the substance reflected in that title if not put into practice at
all. Instances of an employee holding himself or herself out to be a minister,
however, may hold greater weight, and as such demonstrate an embracing of
ministerial status. Still, each factor depends on the facts proffered to support it,
and which of those facts should reasonably be given significance.

400
See id. The court found only function was satisfied, but instead of giving that significant weight (as the
employee’s functions were largely ministerial), the court found satisfaction of function to be insufficient by
virtue of it being only a single factor. See id.
401
See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2068 (2020).
402
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 200 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring); see supra Part II.B.2.
403
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192, 194.
404
See Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2017).
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B. Analyzing Religious Importance in the Context of Significant Facts
Characterizing what types of functions and attributes indicate an employee
“whose functions are essential to the independence of practically all religious
groups” will also help guide the analysis more consistently.405 Further,
characterizing what attributes indicate religious importance in an employee’s
title, the substance reflected in that title, and the employee’s own perception of
their role, are key to determining whether the factors other than function are
satisfied. Both Starkman and Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor
provide beneficial insight into what these attributes may be.406
Religious importance is, in large part, demonstrated by the functional
essentiality of an employee.407 Functionally essential employees may be
characterized as “those who serve in positions of leadership, those who perform
important functions in worship services and in the performance of religious
ceremonies and rituals, and those who are entrusted with teaching and conveying
the tenets of the faith to the next generation.”408 If all of these are met, weight
should be allocated to function, perhaps alone sufficient to indicate ministerial
status. If only one is met, such as teaching the faith to the next generation, then
less—but still significant—weight should be given toward ministerial status,
depending on the extent to which the employee spreads the faith. Generally, facts
that may indicate this functional importance include teaching a religious class
beyond a historical perspective, leading prayer, and planning or leading multiple
religious services monthly or even annually.409
Ambiguity still exists, especially as to what “perform[ing] important
functions in worship services and in the performance of religious ceremonies
and rituals” means.410 Interpreted narrowly, it may mean the performance of
functions that are literally a part of the formal religious service or ritual. More
broadly, it may be interpreted to mean any function important to furthering the
religious service or ritual—including keeping young students well-behaved.411
405

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring).
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1999); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
407
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200 (Alito, J., concurring).
408
Id.
409
See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192; Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655,
660 (7th Cir. 2018); Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 2018); Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of
Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 461 (9th Cir. 2019).
410
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 200.
411
See id.; Biel, 911 F.3d at 609. The Supreme Court in Morrissey-Berru takes this broader approach,
equating Biel, an employee who accompanied her students to Mass and participated when they led prayer, to
Morrissey-Berru or Perich, employees who, for example, led Masses, led their students in prayer, and directed
406
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Keeping an eye toward the purpose of the exception as well as the purpose of
this proposal, the narrower interpretation is more appropriate, despite potentially
requiring courts to look, albeit at a surface level, at matters of religious
doctrine.412 In that regard, Starkman also adds that if the employee “engaged in
activities traditionally considered ecclesiastical or religious,” the employee’s
function should balance in favor of the exception.413 Determining what is
“traditionally ecclesiastical or religious,” however, may be a difficult task for
the court to engage in without delving too deeply into religion.414
Next, the employment decisions surrounding the employee’s position, if
made “largely on religious criteria,” should point toward religious
importance.415 Certain facts indicate an express expectation of religiosity and
should be given significant weight in the ministerial analysis. A key example
would be a contract expressly allocating to an employee a religious title or
consistent religious duties. Another example may be an offer letter expressing
that past professional experience administering religion was the employer’s
reason for hiring the employee. In conjunction with incidental facts of an
employee’s actual religious duties, reputation, self-perception, and title, these
formal expressions demonstrate an agreed-upon level of religiosity.
Even more persuasive would be a contract expressly stating that the
employee is a minister and thus subject to the ministerial exception, indicating
a mutual understanding of and an agreement to its implications. Still, these types
of documents alone would not suffice to prove ministerial status and would
require a showing of ministerial function. If, for example, such a contract was to
be taken at face value, even if the employee was in no practical way a minister,
an employer could abuse the ministerial exception by including such a provision
in all of its contracts. In Morrissey-Berru, for example, the Supreme Court
majority relied heavily on the employment agreements stating that faculty were
expected to help carry out the school’s core mission of “educating and forming
students in the Catholic faith.”416 While this mission would provide context for
employees’ subsequent religious functions, those functions must still then be
weighed: Did the employee go above and beyond in fulfilling that mission? Did
Easter plays. 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2059, 2066, 2068 (2020).
412
WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 237–38. To accommodate variation among religions, courts would
likely have to know what a worship service, religious ceremony, or ritual looks like for the religion in question,
though only at a base level. Id. at 238.
413
Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological
Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)).
414
Id.
415
Id. at 176.
416
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. at 2066.
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the employee meet the bare minimum requirements to fulfill that mission? If the
employee did only the bare minimum, was that amount sufficient to deem her a
minister? In the case of Biel, her fulfillment of this mission seemed to be the
bare minimum, and though she may have come close to ministerial status, she
should not have been deemed a minister in looking at the context of her
employment and the context of ministerial exception cases as a whole.417
Situations in which an employee is identified as “called” or “lay” would also
serve as an important indicator of ministerial status, as it may serve to support
any or all of the factors of title, how the employer held out the employee, and
how the employee held herself out or understood her role.418 Formal ordination,
though a factor to consider, is a Judeo-Christian concept that does not have a
“clear counterpart” in all religions.419 Thus, courts should be mindful of
religions, such as Islam, in which every member of the religion “can perform the
religious rites.”420 Considering characteristics unique to individual religions is
not over-imposing and is necessary to account for pluralism, as well as to allow
courts to differentiate between individuals who are simply relaying religious
tenets as part of their employment duties from those who are ministering to the
faithful as part of their employment duties.421 Finally, any religious certifications
or trainings, if supported by detailed and formal program descriptions, may
support a finding of religious importance and ministerial status. Vague mention
of a religious training program or curriculum does not support a finding of
ministerial status, as it leaves open questions as to the extensiveness of a
program, voluntariness of completion, and importance to the employment in
question and its religious aspects.422
Clarification of the ministerial exception’s scope may be achieved by an act
of Congress to better define Title VII in the context of religious employers, or
by a new Supreme Court ruling. However, setting clear lines again runs the risk
of excessive government entanglement with the church and infringement on
employment decisions, making line-drawing difficult and perhaps something the
Court is unlikely to do.423 Thus, if no such legislative or judicial guidance comes
417

Id. at 2071–72, 2077–78 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191–92; Grussgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day Sch., Inc., 882 F.3d 655,
659–60 (7th Cir. 2018).
419
Fratello v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 207 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 198, 202 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring)).
420
Id.
421
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 202 nn.3–4 (Alito, J., concurring).
422
See Grussgott, 882 F.3d at 659.
423
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (declining to adopt a rigid formula); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v.
Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2067 (2020) (affirming the denial to adopt a rigid formula).
418
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along, the above proposal seeks to provide lower courts with a reasoned mode
of analysis that could at least urge a more consistent application of HosannaTabor, and avoid the slippery slope that may accompany the Morrissey-Berru
holding.
CONCLUSION
Although the proposed analysis would attempt to address some issues of
consistency and fairness, the concerns still exist surrounding the ministerial
exception’s application in general. Striking the perfect level of government
involvement in matters of church-state relations is difficult to do. Zero
involvement is not a feasible option, but beyond that, the ideal level is hard to
define, though this proposal attempts to find a balance.
Even with a clarified test, one concern deriving from the exception’s
applicability to all antidiscrimination laws is whether courts will continue to be
more focused on religious liberty of religious institutions than they are on other
fundamental and statutory rights of the individual employee. Perhaps the
exception really should be limited to cases of religious discrimination and,
beyond that, discrimination laws should be deemed “valid and neutral law[s] of
general applicability and therefore applicable to the Church, even if [they]
impose[] a ‘substantial burden’ on [a religious institution’s] operation.”424
Another concern is whether application of the exception enables abuses by
religious institutions. While the level of abuse may be limited by a better-defined
mode of analysis, as the number of employees falling under the exception would
be restricted, potential for abuse would not be fully quashed as application of the
exception at all could permit abuse of the exception for obvious ministerial
employees.425 Lastly, does the government even truly achieve its goal of
avoiding Establishment Clause issues through a ministerial exception? While
one of the main stated goals of this exception is to avoid excessive entanglement
and establishment of religion, through having such an exception the government
seemingly favors religion over no religion by deeming antidiscrimination laws
inapplicable to religious institutions. The Court in Amos explicitly denied

424
WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 30, at 237 (citing Emp. Div., Dept. of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 877–79 (1990)).
425
The ministerial exception does not bar sexual harassment claims, a positive limitation to potential abuse
of the exemption. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, #MeToo Meets the Ministerial Exception: Sexual Harassment
Claims by Clergy and the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, 25 WM. & MARY J. RACE GENDER & SOC. JUST.
249, 250–51 (2019).
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unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause, but that understanding does
not assuage all doubt.426
The proposal here attempts to address one gray area of the ministerial
exception—who is a minister for purposes of the exemption and thereby barred
from bringing suit against their religious employer. Through clarifying the
balance between function and title and enumerating factors indicative of
religious importance, this proposal draws upon the fundamental purpose of the
ministerial exception and ensure courts’ analyses center on the idea of religious
importance and essential religious functions. Now that the Supreme Court has
dramatically broadened the ministerial exception, in accordance with some
lower court practices, the exception may slowly be extended to cover cases less
and less indicative of ministerial status, allotting to religious organizations
excessive freedom to discriminate against any employee resembling a minister
in any way. Surely the framers of the Constitution did not intend for religious
institutions to be completely free from any law of general applicability short of
crime, and surely courts can find a way to engage in a fair analysis of the
ministerial exception.
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